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General anti avoidance provisions (“GAAR”) in the Income Tax Act and the 
accompanying judicial doctrines have been developed to combat schemes that are designed 
primarily to avoid the incidence of taxation by exploiting the loopholes in the Act. On the 
other hand, trusts in South Africa have commonly been used as a means to warehouse and 
freeze assets in order to minimise estate duty and also in schemes designed to minimise or 
escape income tax and donations tax. 
 
In South Africa the GAAR provisions (sections 80A to 80L) are fairly new and there is no 
case law yet to provide guidance on the depth and its scope of application. This dissertation 
seeks to analyse the impact that the new provisions of the general anti avoidance rules and 
the so-called judicial doctrines have on transactions or schemes involving a trust. It will 
also try to answer whether the previous general anti avoidance rules (section 103(1)) was 
effective against these schemes/transactions and, if not, whether the new provisions are 
effective against previously successful schemes/transactions. 
 
In that perspective, chapter one provides an introduction and the research methodology 
adopted to provide a possible answer to the research question. Chapter two introduces the 
concept of trusts in South Africa, the types and classes of trust available in the legal system 
and the different components and parties to a trust. Chapter three will be focused on a 
discussion of both the old and the new GAAR and includes a comparison of the provisions 
to analyse the possible impact on the selected structured transactions. In chapter four, the 
common tax tools involving trusts will be introduced in the form of examples and the tax 
benefit resulting will be discussed and analysed and then applied against both the old and 
new provisions. Chapter five provides the conclusions reached and proposed 
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Introduction and Research Methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Trusts are regularly used as tax planning tools to enable taxpayers to minimise or, at times, 
avoid tax liabilities. This dissertation seeks to analyse selected transactions involving the 
interposition of a trust and whether or not the new GAAR renders such structured 
transactions obsolete. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The primary objective is to analyse the impact the new GAAR has on trusts created as part 
of a tax plan (for example, an estate plan). The secondary objective is to discuss the 





This dissertation aims to: 
 Analyse the common structured transactions involving the interposition of a trust 
and the tax savings benefit and or tax avoidance that such transactions provide; 
 Through discussion and comparison, analyse the old and new GAAR and the 
requirements for successful application (Chapter 3);   
 Test the selected tax structured transactions against the requirements for successful 
application of the old and new GAAR (Chapter 4). 
                                                          
1
 Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and another v CIR, 58 SATC 229 (A):236; Lord Tomlin in IRC v Duke of 
Westminster [1936] AC 1 at 19; Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622, Para 45; CSARS v LG 
Electronics (428/09) [2010] ZASCA 79 (28 May 2010), Para 25; CSARS v NWK (27/10) [2010] ZASCA 168 

















1.3 Research Methodology 
This dissertation follows a doctrinal research methodology.  McKerchar (2008: 18-19) 
states that “Doctrinal research is […] typified by the systematic process of identifying, 
analysing, organising and synthesising statutes, judicial decisions and commentary”.  In 
this context, the legislation, judicial decisions and commentary from South Africa, Canada, 
Australia and the United Kingdom concerning GAAR are analysed (Chapter 3) to provide 
the basis against which the analysis of the tax planning tools may be conducted (Chapter 
4).   The choice of Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom as additional sources is 
justified as the South African Legislature and the South African courts have drawn on 
legislation and case law from each of these jurisdictions in the past.   
 
1.4 Limitations 
This dissertation is limited to the consideration of transactions involving the interposition 
of South African trusts where all persons engaged in the transaction are residents.  Non-
South African trusts or non-South African parties to the transactions are not addressed.  
Many of the principles applied to these transactions may, however, extend to such non-
South African trusts.  It should be noted that non-South African trusts would require the 
consideration of additional sections of the ITA and their application, for example S7(8), 
S25B(2) of the ITA.  In addition, the possible applications of DTAs are not considered.  
All connected persons
2
 to the trusts in the scenarios considered are also assumed to be 
residents
3
 in the Republic. 
 
                                                          
2



















1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The study is divided into five chapters including this introductory chapter.  Chapter 2 
provides the background to the concept of trusts in South Africa and the different types of 
trusts available. It is in this context that the interposition of the trust is considered.   
 
Chapter 3 provides the analysis of the old GAAR (section 103(1)) and the new GAAR 
(sections 80A to 80L) of the ITA in order to identify the main requirements for a 
successful application of these anti-avoidance provisions.  In addition, the chapter 
considers the application of the judicial doctrines of substance versus legal form in the 
context of the application of GAAR. Since no precedents from our courts are available on 
the interpretation of the new GAAR, the general rules applicable to the interpretation of 
fiscal legislation are applied to these new GAAR provisions using foreign precedents for 
additional guidance as to its interpretation. 
 
Chapter 4 contains the key test of structured transactions against the old and new GAAR.  
This chapter is presented in the form of scenario analysis (by example) to provide context 
to the structured transaction being analysed.  The tax implications, savings and / or 
avoidance that arise through the application of such transactions will be outlined and these 
transactions will then be tested against both the old and new GAAR. 
 
Chapter 5 contains the conclusions and recommendations that will help the taxpayer in 



















A brief introduction to the concept of trust in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction and the history of trusts in South Africa 
This chapter will outline the “trust” concept in South Africa.  A discussion of the types and 
classes of trust is also considered.  
 
The English trust found its way to South Africa when the Cape became a British colony 
and at the time Roman Dutch law remained the official legal system as part of a treaty.
4
 In 
common law, a trust is neither a legal person nor a juristic person and therefore does not 
enjoy a separate legal persona.
5
 It is deemed to be a separate legal person for the purpose 
of some statutes only, e.g. the ITA and the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 amongst 
others. S1 of the ITA states that for the purpose of the Act a trust:  
“means any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered and controlled by a 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is appointed under a deed of trust or by 
agreement or under the will of a deceased person”. 
 
The definition of person in the ITA was only amended in 1992 to include a trust, following 
the decision in the case of CIR v Friedman & others NNO
6
 where it was held that a trust 
was not a “legal persona” and therefore not a “person” within the meaning of that word in 
the ITA and accordingly the Commissioner was not entitled (at that time) to levy taxation 
on the trust in terms of the ITA. 
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 WM Van der Westhuizen, 2009, Wills and Trusts, Butterworths, B1-B2, p4 
5
 Yarran Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v Absa Bank Ltd 2007 2 SA 570 (SCA), Pg576H, WM Van der 
Westhuizen, 2009, Wills and Trusts, Butterworths, B1-B2, p4 
6


















2.2 Classes of trusts 
Trusts can be divided into two main groups: 
Inter vivos trust.  Inter vivos being a Latin word which means “among the living” referring 
to its creation during the life of the founder.  This type of trust can extend beyond the 
founder’s life. 
 
A testamentary trust, or trust mortis causa, will only apply with the death of the founder 
and is created by the last will and testament of the testator. It is worth to note that a 
testamentary trust has limited use as part of a tax tool in an estate planning. This is due to 
the fact at the time of death, the testator still owns all his assets and thus in terms of 
Paragraph 40 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA, will deemed to have disposed of all these 
assets (save from exemptions listed in subparagraph (a) to (d)) and will thus be liable to 
CGT. These assets will also form part of his estate by virtue of S 3(2) of the EDA and will 
thus be subject to estate duty. However, a testamentary trust may benefit the heir(s) of the 
deceased person, as the assets bequeathed to the trust, will not form part of their estate 
unless there is a vesting of trust assets to the beneficiaries. 
 
2.3 Types of trust 
A trust can either be a discretionary or vesting trust. 
 
2.3.1 Discretionary trust  
In a discretionary trust, ownership and management of the trust’s assets are vested in the 
trustees but they have no interest in those assets.
7
 The beneficiaries also hold no rights over 
the assets of the trusts; they hold a mere spes (hope). The beneficiaries only have right to 
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claim income and/or capital that are due to them once it has been vested by the trustees to 
the beneficiaries. 
 
The extent of the discretionary powers that vest in the trustees is determined in the trust 
deed. It is submitted that a trust can also be partly discretionary, where part of the trust 
capital and /or income is subject to the trustee’s discretionary power and the other is vested 
in the beneficiaries. 
 
The trust deed may also empower the trustees to make distributions in unequal shares to 
the beneficiaries or even exclude certain beneficiaries from any distribution. The Trustees 
may also be empowered by the trust deed to appoint further beneficiaries or remove 
existing beneficiaries.
8
 An important feature of a discretionary trust is that the growth in 
assets owned by the trust prior to death of the founder is not added to his/her assets for 
estate duty purposes. 
 
2.3.2 Vested trusts 
In a vested trust, the ownership of the trust’s assets is vested in the beneficiaries and the 
trustees only have control and the management of those assets. In the case of Jewish 
Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan
9
 Watermeyer CJ described that “the word vest is used to 
draw a distinction between what is certain and what is conditional” and in another case of Durban 
City Council v Association of Building Societies,
10
 the same judge described that “the word 
contingent as opposed to vested is used to describe the conditional nature of someone’s title to the right.” 
 
                                                          
8
 Davis et al, Estate Planning, LexisNexis, Pg 5-14 
9
 1940 AD 163, p 175 
10

















Therefore if a beneficiary has a vested right in a trust capital or income, this will form part 
of his assets for the computation of capital gains tax on death of the beneficiary and also 
part of his estate for estate duty purposes. In a vested trust, the ownership of the trust’s 
assets is vested in the beneficiaries and the trustees only have control over the management 
of those assets. The trustees have no discretion as to distributions. They must distribute or 
accrue the net income and/or trust capital in terms of the trust deed. These types of trusts 
do not offer as many financial planning opportunities as discretionary trusts and they are 
more often set up for reasons other than taxation. 
 
2.3.3 Special Trusts 
The concept of special trust
11
 was introduced by the legislature for income tax purposes 
only and is defined in Section 1 of the ITA, it consists of two categories. On the other 
hand, for the purpose of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA, a special trust would mean only 
category (a) of the definition of the special trust as listed in S 1 of the ITA. 
 
                                                          
11
 means a trust created- 
a)        solely for the benefit of a person who suffers from— 
i)          any ‘mental illness’ as defined in section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002 (Act 
No. 17 of 2002); or 
ii)         any serious physical disability, 
where such illness or disability incapacitates such person from earning sufficient income for 
the maintenance of such person, or from managing his or her own financial affairs: Provided 
that where the person for whose benefit the trust was so created dies, such trust shall be 
deemed not to be a special trust in respect of years of assessment ending on or after the date of 
such person’s death; 
b)        by or in terms of the will of a deceased person, solely for the benefit of beneficiaries who are relatives 
in relation to that deceased person and who are alive on the date of death of that deceased person 
(including any beneficiary who has been conceived but not yet born on that date), where the youngest 



















These types of trusts enjoy a number of benefits, for example taxation at the marginal rates 
applicable to natural persons.  However, by virtue of Section 6 of the ITA such trusts are 
not entitled to a primary rebate. In addition, these trusts are not entitled to the basic interest 
exemption applicable to natural persons by virtue of Section 10(1)(i)(xv) of the ITA. 
 
Another benefit of a special trust as listed in Para (a) of S 1, is that qualifies for an 
inclusion rate of 25% for Capital Gains Tax purposes and Primary Residence exclusion in 
terms of Para 44 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA.  This trust  is also entitled to hold 
personal use assets which are excluded from any Capital Gains consequences by virtue of 
Para  53 of the same Schedule. 
 
It is clear that these types of trusts are not meant to be used as tax planning tools as they 
have very restrictive use. They are meant to be used for specific circumstances, to protect 
the interest of minors and persons with disabilities. 
2.4 The use of trusts 
The concept of trusts has been widely used in South Africa as a tool in estate planning, 
with a view to minimise estate duty payable at the death of a natural person. It can protect 
the personal assets of a natural person by providing a hedge against creditors in the event 
that person becomes insolvent. A trust can also be used as a tool in the protection of family 
assets in the event of dissolution of marriage by preventing any redistribution of assets 
which has been purchased or inherited during the lifetime of one marriage. A trust can be 
ideal to deal with problems of dividing a single immovable property in the sense that it acts 
as a vehicle for the joint ownership of an immovable property. A trust can also be used in a 

















disability.  Parents of such persons often use trusts to ensure the maintenance and well 
being of that person after their death. 
 
2.5 The office of Trustees 
The office of trustees is governed by the Trust Property Control Act.
12
 Critical to the 
concept of trusts is that the founder/donor may not be the sole trustee and the sole 
beneficiary.
13
 This view was also supported by Cameron JA in the case of Land & 




2.5.1 Definition of Trustee 
The definition is trustee is defined in Section 1 of the ITA as: 
“in addition to every person appointed or constituted as such by act of parties, by will, by order or 
declaration of court or by operation of law, includes an executor or administrator, tutor or curator, 
and any person having the administration or control of any property subject to a trust, usufruct, 
fideicommissum or other limited interest or acting in any fiduciary capacity or having, either in a 
private or in an official capacity, the possession, direction, control or management of any property 
of any person under legal disability”. 
 
The term trustee is also defined in Section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act
15
 as: 
“means any person (including the founder of a trust) who acts as trustee by virtue of an 
authorization under section 6 and includes any person whose appointment as trustee is already of 
force and effect at the commencement of this Act”. 
                                                          
12
 Act 57 of 1988 
13
 Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N), Pg 408, Nel & Others vs Metequity Ltd &  
Another 2007 (3) SA 34 (SCA) 37 
14
 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), [2004], Para 19 
15


















The trustee can be any person who has the capacity to act as a trustee. The trustee owes 
fiduciary duty to the trust and his private affairs should be completely separate from the 
trust and thus avoid conflicts of interest at all times.  In the Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker,
16
 Cameron JA described an example of a “proper” trustee as 
follows: 
“but someone who with proper realisation of the responsibilities of trusteeship accepts office in 
order to ensure that the trust functions properly, that the provisions of the trust deed are observed, 
and that the conduct of trustees who lack a sufficiently independent interest in the observance of 
substantive and procedural requirements arising from the trust deed can be scrutinised and checked”. 
 
2.5.2 Appointment of Trustees 
The appointment of a trustee can be made by the founder of the trust, by other trustees 
currently in office, by the beneficiaries, by a court order or by the Master of the High 
Court. The person to be appointed as a trustee must give their consent to act as trustee in 
writing.  Thereafter the Master must issue a written authorisation (letter of authority) to the 
trustee, before that person can act in that capacity.
17
  In the absence of the letter of 





In the event that the number of trustees falls below the minimum number of trustees as 
provided by the trust deed, the other trustees must appoint another trustee, to comply with 
                                                          
16
 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA), Para 36 
17
 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 7(1) 
18


















the requirement of the trust deed.
19
  If the vacant trustee office cannot be filled then the 
Master of the High Court may appoint any person as a trustee.
20
 As long as the number of 
trustees is below the minimum as required by the trust deed, the remaining trustees have no 
authority to bind the trust and any contract or agreement entered by the trust during that 




The office of trustee is governed by the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. In terms of 
this Act, the Master of the High court is empowered to insist on the appointment of 
independent outsiders as trustees, to prevent and restrict the misuse a d abuse of trusts.
22
 
This view was observed in the case of Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v 
Parker,
23
 Cameron JA observed the following: 
“The debasement of the trust form evidenced in this and other cases, and the consequent breaches of 
trust this entails, suggest that the Master should in carrying out his statutory functions ensure that an 
adequate separation of control from enjoyment is maintained in every trust. This can be achieved by 
insisting on the appointment of an independent outsider as trustee to every trust in which (a) the 
trustees are all beneficiaries and (b) the beneficiaries are all related to one another”. 
 
The independent trustee must be able to act as such.  The consequences of a trustee treating 
trust assets as his own and using an independent trustee merely as a “rubber stamp” was 
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 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 
20
 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 7(1) 
21
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 
22
 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 s 7(2) 
23
 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA), Para 35 
24

















2.5.3  Powers and duties of Trustees 
The powers enjoyed by the trustees will entirely depend on the provisions of the trust deed; 





Trustees have the duty to act jointly, unless specified otherwise in the Trust deed and 
failure to do so in contracting an agreement to bind the trust may be null and void.
26
 
However, in the case of Man Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor en Andere,
27
 it was held that 
where a trustee had bound the trust to a suretyship agreement, without the consent of the 
other trustees, the agreement remained binding on the trust by virtue of the application of 
the Turquand Rule.
28
 This would appear to be the exception to the rule as evidenced in the 
case of Thorpe v Trittenwein
29
 where the court found that in the absence of a joint decision, 
the assent of a single trustee to a contract did not bind the trust. 
 
Trustees are required to exercise due care and diligence and use reasonable judgement in 
the best interest of the trust
30
 and any indemnity clause in the trust deed attempting to 
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 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 
26
 Niewoudt & Another NNO V Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) 
27
 2001 (2) SA 562 (NC) 
28
 Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327 is a UK company law case that held people transacting 
with companies are entitled to assume that internal company rules are complied with, even if they are not. 
This "indoor management rule" or the "Rule in Turquand's Case" is applicable in most of the common law 
world. It originally mitigated the harshness of the constructive notice doctrine. 
29
 2006 SCA 30 (SCA) 
30
 PPWAWU National Provident Fund v CEPPWAWU 2008 (2) SA 351 (WLD) 
31

















A trustee is entitled to be remunerated for his services rendered to the trust; the trust deed 
may provide for the quantum and the conditions for payment. In absence of any provisions 




The essence of the formation of a trust is that the trust’s income and capital must be 
controlled by the trustees for the benefits of the beneficiaries. The ITA defines a 
beneficiary as follows: 
“in relation to a trust means a person who has a vested or contingent interest in all or a portion of the 
receipts or accruals or the assets of that trust.” 
 
2.6.1     Rights of beneficiaries 
There may also be different classes of beneficiaries with different rights. For example, 
certain beneficiaries might have a vested or a discretionary interest in the trust. The said 
interest may further be specific, either capital or income or both. In a bewind trust, the 
beneficiaries have vested rights in the trust income and capital. 
The rights the beneficiaries enjoy will be determined by the provisions of the trust deed or 
it can be left to the discretion of trustees in the case of discretionary trusts. 
2.7  Conclusion 
 
Although there are several types and classes of trust available in the South African legal 
system, one must choose a type and class of trust that will best suit his/her needs while also 
taking into consideration the financial flexibilities and taxation implications each kind of 
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trusts provide. The administration of the trust is also an important component; when a trust 
is conceptualised, the founder(s) and the trustees are bound to adhere to the provisions of 
the trust deed and also to its statutory requirements, as any departures  therefrom may 


















A discussion and comparison between the new and old GAAR 
 
3.1 Background and introduction to the new GAAR 
The new GAAR, namely Part IIA of the ITA (sections 80A to 80L), has been effective as 
from 2 November 2006, replacing the old GAAR, namely sections 103(1), (3), and (7). It is 
submitted that GAAR’s purpose is to draw the line between legitimate tax minimisation 




Part IIA of the ITA will also apply in a situation where the primary purpose is to avoid 
taxes (other than those covered in the ITA) but has also resulted in an avoidance of taxes 
administered under the ITA
34
 (a secondary purpose), since the term “tax” includes any tax, 
levy or duty imposed by the ITA or any other Act
35
 administered by the Commissioner.
36
  
It would seem that this concept has found its way in the ITA, from the judgement 
emanating from SIR v Gallagher,
37
 whereby the Commissioner had invoked section 103(1) 
of the ITA against the taxpayer on a scheme involving avoidance of estate duty. On the 
facts of this case, the taxpayer had successfully argued that his sole and main purpose of 
                                                          
33
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SCC 54 
34
 Examples of taxes administered under the ITA are: Income Tax, Donations Tax, CGT 
35
 Examples of such “other Acts” are: Value Added Tax Act No. 89 of 1991, Estate Duty Act No. 45 of 1955, 
Transfer Duty Act No. 40 of 1949, etc. 
36
 The concept of linking GAAR to other Acts administered by CSARS is not new, S80L merely rephrase the 
old S103(7) which stated that: 
“a tax benefit would incorporate ’any avoidance, postponement or reduction of liability for payment 
of any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act or by any other law administered by the 
Commissioner.” 
37

















the creation of three trusts was to minimise estate duty and the income tax benefit obtained 
was merely a welcomed by-product and thus S 103(1) was inapplicable. 
 
One of the most popular uses of trusts remains for estate planning, which has the purpose 
of minimising or avoiding estate duty.
38
 This is normally achieved by the transfer of 
growth assets from the founder/donor to the trust and hence the capital appreciation of the 
assets occurs in the trust rather than in the hands of the individual (the founder of the trust). 
At the date of death of the natural person, the latter must hold the minimum assets possible. 
In terms of S 2 of the EDA, assets of the trusts not held by the deceased immediately prior 
to his death are excluded from estate duty. The later chapters will demonstrate that it is not 
only the avoidance of estate duty that is considered by taxpayers, but the minimisation of 
all taxes
39
 (i.e. the structure that yields the maximum advantage).   
 
The question to be answered in this dissertation is whether or not this type of structure or 
any part thereof could fall within the ambit of Part IIA of the ITA.  Should it not fall within 
the ambit of Part IIA, it would remain an efficient tax planning scheme.  
 
To assist in the analysis, the new and the old GAAR will both be applied to selected trust 
schemes.  Schemes which escaped application in terms of the old GAAR are particularly 
relevant to test whether or not these schemes remain free from the scope of the new GAAR 
and thus are still efficient tax planning tools under the new provisions of the ITA.
40
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The objective of this dissertation is to attempt to address the above problem, as to define 
the boundaries and limitations of the new GAAR and the extent a taxpayer is entitled to 
minimise its tax burden using a trust as a mechanism. 
 
Following Lord Tomlin’s obiter in the IRC v Duke of Westminster case, the same views 
were also shared in other cases, such as in Levene v IRC,
41
 where Lord Viscount Summer 
held that: 
“It is trite law that His Majesty’s subjects are free, if they can, to make their own arrangements so 
that their cases may fall outside the scope of the taxing Act. They incur no legal penalties, and they 
strictly speaking, no moral censure if having considered the lines drawn by the legislature for the 
imposition of taxes, they make it their business to walk outside them”.  
 
However, Lord’s Tomlin’s decision in the oft-cited case IRC v Duke of Westminster
42
 
should not also be taken at face value and be applied in all tax avoidance/minimisation 
transaction. This is a decision from 1936 and the world economy has since drastically 
changed and the House of Lords in England have also made several adverse comments on 
this case. 
 
In the case of IRC v Burmah Oil Co. Ltd,
43
 Lord Diplock held that Lord Tomlin’s remark 
says nothing as to what methods of ordering one’s affairs will be recognised by the courts 
as effective to lessen the tax that would otherwise attach to them if business transactions 
were conducted in a straightforward way. In the case of IRC v McGuckian,
44
 Lord Steyn, 
made the following remarks: 
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 “While Lord Tomlin’s observation in the Duke of Westminster case still points to a material 
consideration, namely the general liberty of the citizen to arrange his financial affairs as he thinks 
fit, they have ceased to be canonical as to the consequences of tax avoidance schemes”. 
 
Some of the main reasons advanced by the National Treasury, in their discussion paper 
dated 3 November 2005, for the enactment of the new GAAR, are as follows: 
(1) There had been a growing number of complex and sophisticated tax schemes 
especially from the corporate taxpayers and growing numbers of tax avoidance 
products from professional firms;
45
 
(2) Short term revenue loss for the fiscus thus weakening the ability of the Government 
to set and implement economic policies; 
(3) The old GAAR was becoming obsolete with technological change, globalisation, 
de-regulation in financial markets and was also no longer in line with international 
standards. 
It is unclear as to which “international standards” the Treasury referred, however 
critics on the matter state hat this contention can be misleading as advanced 
countries have refrained from introducing such legislation and still prefer to rely on 
judicial general anti-avoidance doctrines.
46
 
3.2 The requirements for application of the new GAAR 
In the new GAAR much emphasis is placed on an “impermissible avoidance 
arrangement”,
47
 the provisions of Part IIA of the ITA are interlinked to define its scope and 
application. The main criteria of an impermissible tax arrangement can be broken, as 
follows: 
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1. There should be the presence of an avoidance arrangement;48 
2. The avoidance arrangement or steps therein must result in a tax benefit;49 
3. The sole or main purpose of the arrangement in issue was to obtain the tax benefit and 
also any one of the following must be present simultaneously; 
4. The abnormality test;50  
5. Any one of the tainted element tests as listed hereunder: 




5.2 The creation of non-arm’s length rights and obligations test;
52
 




6. The commercial substance test in 5.1 above contains a list of non-exhaustive 
indicators as listed hereunder:
54
 
6.1 The substance versus form doctrine;
55
 
6.2 The presence of round trip financing;
56
 
6.3 An accommodating or tax indifferent party;
57
 
6.4 Elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other;
58
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The new GAAR was drawn largely from S 245 of the Canadian Income Tax Act.   The 
Canadian courts have applied their GAAR cautiously and conservatively, as demonstrated 
hereunder.61 
  
In the Jabs Construction case,
62
 Associate Chief Justice Bowman of the Tax Court referred 
to the GAAR as follows: 
“Section 245 is an extreme sanction. It should not be used routinely every time the Minister gets upset just 
because a taxpayer structures a transaction in a tax effective way, or does not structure it in a way that 
maximizes the tax”. 
 
In the Canada Trustco case,
63
 Justice Miller warned that: 
“GAAR is not to be imposed lightly. . . .[T]his is tax legislation to be applied with utmost caution”. 
 
In the Fredette case,
64
 Justice Archambault wrote: 
“Section 245 is a powerful tool for discouraging and preventing flagrant abuses of the Act. It cannot serve as 





 Associate Chief Justice Bowman wrote: 
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“The Income Tax Act is a statute that is remarkable for its specificity and replete with anti-avoidance 
provisions designed to counteract specific perceived abuses. Where a taxpayer applies those provisions and 
manages to avoid the pitfalls the Minister cannot say: ‘Because you have avoided the shoals and traps of the 
Act and have not carried out your commercial transaction in a manner that maximizes your tax, I will use 
GAAR to fill in any gaps not covered by the multitude of specific anti-avoidance provisions.’ That is not 
what GAAR is all about”. 
 
The provisions of Part IIA of the ITA are new in South Africa and contain terms imported 
into the legislation.  Their meaning has not been tested in the South African courts.  
However, the above foreign decisions may be persuasive and/or serve as guidelines on the 
course that may be followed in South Africa. 
3.3 Tax consequences in a successful application of GAAR 
Tax avoidance is not considered to be illegal; it is merely the manner in which a taxpayer 
exploits the provisions of the Acts to his advantage and thus arranges his affairs 
accordingly, so as to attract less tax than would normally be imposed. S 80B empowers the 
Commissioner to disregard a whole arrangement, reallocate income or expenditure, as 
though the transactions had never occurred. 
3.4 The burden of proof 
The burden of proof is generally governed by S 82 of the ITA, which places the onus on 
the taxpayer to prove to the CSARS, that any amount is not liable to tax.  In the case of 
Conhage,
66
 under the old S 103(1), the SCA held that the onus rested on the CSARS to 
prove that the effect of a “transaction, operation or scheme” was to avoid or postpone the 
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liability for tax or to reduce the amount thereof.
67
 Consequently S 82 could not be applied 
to S 103(1) of the ITA. 
 
Once CSARS had proved that a tax benefit arises, the onus of proof shifted to the taxpayer 
to prove that the arrangement does not fall within the ambit of S 103(1).  
 
In the new GAAR, a similar approach would seem to be adopted in the sense that the 
CSARS bears the onus to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that a ‘tax benefit’ was 
derived as a result of an arrangement being entered into.
68
 However, in addition to S 82 of 
the ITA, the presumption of purpose test as provided in S 80G of the ITA will then shift 
this onus to the taxpayer. The preamble of this provision indicates that once CSARS has 
established an avoidance transaction, it will be presumed that such avoidance has for its 
sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit until proven otherwise by the taxpayer.  
 
On the issue of the onus of proving the existence of any of the tainted elements, Olivier is 
of view that on the strength of the Conhage
69
 case, it would appear that the onus is on 
CSARS to prove the abnormality, lack of commercial substance and misuse or abuse 
requirements notwithstanding S 82 of the ITA.
70
 It must here be highlighted that there are 
merits in Olivier’s views; in a foreign case, the Supreme Court of Appeal of Canada held 
that the onus rests on the Commissioner to prove that there was an abusive tax avoidance 
transaction under S 245(4), in the sense that it cannot be reasonably concluded that a tax 
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The National Treasury’s explanation for the introduction of section S 80G of the ITA is 
that it has the purpose to expose a step or part that has the sole or main purpose of 
obtaining a tax benefit which may no longer be “camouflaged” by the legitimate purpose 




Therefore for a taxpayer to discharge the onus placed by S 82 and S 80G of the ITA, a 
mere assertion that tax avoidance was not the sole or main purpose, will not suffice.
73
 
Although the courts tend to view and give due consideration and weight to a taxpayer’s 
ipse dixit,
74
 the taxpayer will have to produce to the courts satisfactory evidence and the 
circumstances for entering a particular transaction to discharge the onus of proving that it 
does not have for its sole or primary motive a tax benefit. 
3.5 The Court’s interpretation of ITA and GAAR 
Since the provisions of Part IIA of the ITA are relatively new there has not been any case 
which has been heard by our courts on this subject. It is therefore important to consider the 
likelihood of how the courts may interpret Part IIA of the ITA. Although the rules of 
interpretation are not confined only to the GAAR but to the fiscal legislation as a whole, 
the precedents from the courts are a useful indication. Generally in the interpretation of 
statutes including the ITA, the courts have adopted two approaches namely, the traditional 
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approach or the modern approach. It is submitted that both approaches are not mutually 




3.5.1 The traditional approach 
The traditional approach of the interpretation of the fiscal legislation, involves a literal 
interpretation of the Act and its application to the particular facts and circumstances. The 
courts have in certain distinct instances, especially where there is an ambiguity or absurdity 
in the legislation, departed from its literal meaning to give the real intention of the 
legislature. 
 
In the case of Glen Anil Development Corporation,
76
 it was held that fiscal legislation 
should not be interpreted differently to other legislation and the true intention of the 
legislature is of paramount importance. In delivering his judgment, Hefer JA quoted with 
approval the dictum stated by Lord Cairns in Partington v The Attorney-General:
77
  
“If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the 
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the law the 
case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be an equitable construction, certainly such a 
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However, our courts have also highlighted the dangers of speculating on the intention of 
the legislature. In the Savage
79
 case, in delivering his judgment, Centrlivres CJ quoted with 
approval the dictum of De Villiers JA, who stated that: 
“Moreover, as has often been remarked by eminent Judges, ‘it is dangerous to speculate as to the intention of 
the Legislature, and what seems an absurdity to one man does not seem absurd to another’. The absurdity 





In the same vein, in a more recent case, Coetzee J stressed the fact that the principles 
applied  in the interpretation of tax statues are similar to other statues, in the sense that one 




It was previously accepted by the courts that equity is not a subject matter in the 
interpretation of fiscal legislation and the burden of tax must be enforced by the courts 
however unfair or inequitable it may appear to be to the taxpayer.
82
 However, due 
consideration must also be given to S 39
83
 of the Constitution of South Africa, which 
enforce equality and fairness in the interpretation of any legislation.  
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3.5.2 The modern approach 
The modern approach of the interpretation of the fiscal legislation seeks to ascertain the 
real purpose of the legislation by looking at it in a particular context, rather than 
speculating on the legislature’s intention. Hefer JA by using this approach has given a 
purpose to the anti-avoidance provision of S 103(2), where he stated the following: 
“In any event I do not understand the rule to be that every provision of a fiscal statute, whether it 
relates to the tax imposed or not, should be construed with due regard to any rules relating to the 
interpretation of fiscal legislation. Section 103 of the Act is clearly directed at defeating tax 
avoidance schemes. It does not impose a tax, nor does it relate to the tax imposed by the Act or to 
the liability there for or to the incidence thereof, but rather to schemes designed for the avoidance of 
liability there for. It should, in my view, therefore, not be construed as a taxing measure but rather in 
such a way that it will advance the remedy provided by the section and suppress the mischief against 
which the section is directed (Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949(1) SA 842(AD) at 852, and 
see generally Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes 12 ed 40 et seq). The discretionary powers 




The definition of a detailed purposive construction was also given by Hurt AJA in the 
more recent case of Airworld CC and another,
85
 where the Court had to decide on the 
purpose of Ss 64B and 64C of the ITA. The learned Judge formulated this approach in the 
following four-fold process: 
a. To consider the words in the legislation to decide whether the meaning is clear; 
b. To consider whether the word, properly considered in its context, is nevertheless 
ambiguous; 
c. If there is an ambiguity, use the rules of interpretation to resolve such ambiguity 
and arriving at an interpretation which accords as well as possible both with the 
language which the legislature has used and with its apparent intention; 
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d. To endeavour to arrive at an interpretation that gives effect to that purpose. 
 
In a more subjective approach, Wunsh J, stressed the fact that the rule in the interpretation 
of tax avoidance provisions should be construed in such a way that it will advance the 
remedy provided thereby and suppress the mischief against which it is directed.
86
 The 
modern (purposive) approach was also favoured in the De Beers case, Nienaber JA stated 
that “the language of a provision must take its colour, like a chameleon, from its setting 
and surrounds in the Act”.
87
 
3.5.3 Foreign courts interpretation 
In the Canada Trustco
88
 case, the Supreme Court of Appeal of Canada held that that for 
the interpretation of the misuse and abuse test as provided by S 245(4), the following two-
fold step must be undertaken: 
I The courts must conduct a unified textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the 
 provisions giving rise to the tax benefit in order to determine why they were put in 
 place and why the benefit was conferred.  The goal is to arrive at a purposive 
 interpretation that is  harmonious with the provisions of the Act that confer the tax 
 benefit, read in the context of the whole Act; 
 
II The court must examine the factual context of the case in order to determine 
 whether the avoidance transaction defeated or frustrated the object, spirit or 
 purpose of the provisions in  issue 
 
                                                          
86
 ITC 1611 59 SATC 126, p136-137 
87
 De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v CSARS [2002] 3 All SA 181 (A), Para 7; Also similar decisions were reached 
in Standard General Insurance Company Ltd v CCE [2004] 2 All SA 376 (SCA), Metropolitan Life Ltd v 
CSARS [2008] 70 SATC 162 
88

















It is worth noting that the principles of interpretation of the Canadian ITA in Canada 
Trustco’s
89
 case is perfectly harmonised with the principles as laid by Hurt AJA in the 
Airworld’s
90
 case, in the sense that when the words of a provision are precise and 
unambiguous, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a dominant role in the interpretive 
process. On the other hand, in the event of any uncertainty or ambiguity, the Court will 
arrive at an interpretation which accords as well as possible both with the language which 
the legislature has used and with its apparent intention and purpose. 
3.5.4  Conclusion 
As shown above, some of the recent decisions emanating from the courts in South Africa 
demonstrate that a modern approach of interpretation of fiscal legislation is more favoured 
than the traditional approach.
91
 Furthermore since the powers conferred to the CSARS 
under the ‘remedies’ provisions
92





It is also worth to be noted that there are also opposing views of whether the courts will 
favour the application of a purposive approach in our courts due to the fact that our 
jurisprudence is very different from that of Canada and our courts will not adopt a 
purposive approach in interpreting a statute i.e. a consideration of the intention of the 
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3.6 The old GAAR and the requirements for its successful application  
Prior to 2 November 2006, S 103(1) of the ITA dictated the general anti-avoidance 
provision. Its requirements for a successful application by the Commissioner, was that the 
following must be present: 
 
(a) There must be a ‘transaction, operation or scheme’ that has been entered into 
which results in the avoidance, reduction or postponement of a tax liability levied in terms 
of the ITA. The ‘transaction, operation, or scheme’ in issue must have been entered into 
solely or mainly for the purpose obtain a “tax benefit”. 
 
The term ‘transaction, operation or scheme’ has been interpreted to be of such wide import 
that it is difficult to conceive how any question of tax benefit could arise without there 
being a transaction operation or scheme. The provisions of S 103 can be applied only if the 
transaction, operation or scheme in issue, is covered by the terms of that section, if it’s not 




In the case of Meyerowitz v CIR,
96
 it was held that the word ‘scheme’ is a wide term which 
is sufficiently wide to cover a series of transactions within the meaning of section 90 (the 
predecessor to S 103(1) of the ITA). It was further held in that case that where a 
transaction was entered into for bona fide commercial reasons but when that transaction 
subsequently become part of the scheme, it ceases to be an innocent bystander. 
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In the case of SIR v Gallagher,
97
 in delivering his judgment, Corbett JA, held that if the 
purpose of the transaction, operation or scheme does not have the effect of avoidance, 
postponement or reduction of income tax, then S 103(1) is inapplicable.  
 
In the case of CIR v Conhage,
98
 the taxpayer took advantage of the benefits of sale and 
leaseback transactions with a financial institution to buy equipments for its expansion. 
Since the ITA does not distinguish between financial and operational leasing transactions, 
the taxpayer could deduct the lease payments as rentals under S 11(a) of the ITA. Thus the 
Commissioner sought to invoke S 103(1) of the ITA to attack this scheme. The SCA 
agreed in the findings of the Special Court in that the main purpose for entering this 
transaction was not to obtain a tax benefit but to raise capital of its expansion program. The 
taxpayer had the choice of choosing the most efficient tax manner in raising capital and 
thus preferred that choice. The Court also found that the choice made by the taxpayer 
would make perfect business sense and thus S 103(1) could not be invoked by CSARS. 
 
(b) The transaction, operation or scheme must have been entered into in a manner that 
would not normally be entered for bona fide business purposes other than to obtain a tax 
benefit. The said transaction, operation or scheme has created abnormal rights and 
obligations which would have normally been created between persons dealing at arm’s 
length. 
 
It is to be noted that both element listed in (a) and (b) must exist for a successful 
application of S 103(1) of the ITA.  In the case of SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth & Joubert,
99
 it 
was held that although the transactions, operations or scheme was ‘abnormal’, S 103(1) of 
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the ITA could not be applied if the taxpayer had discharged the onus to prove that the 
transaction entered into, does not have for its sole or main purpose to avoid tax. 
 
On the other hand, in the case of SIR v Hicklin,
100
 it was held that the taxpayer did not 
discharge its onus to prove that tax avoidance was not the sole or main purpose for entering 
into an agreement with a dividend stripping company. However, since the parties involved 
were dealing at arm’s length, each parties will strive to obtain the utmost possible 
advantage out of the transaction, therefore the rights and obligations so created will more 
likely be normal than abnormal. Since the abnormality requirement was not present, the 
Commissioner could not invoke S 103(1) of the ITA. 
3.7 Common law principles / judicial doctrines 
As point of departure, prior to applying the provisions of S 103(1) the court may establish 
whether the substance of the transaction differs from its form, in other words the court 
needs to apply the “simulated transaction doctrine”. The application of the said doctrine 
entails an enquiry into the true nature of the activity, as opposed to its purported form.   If 
it is established that a trust is a sham trust, there would be no need for the application of S 
103(1) or Part IIA of the ITA, as under this doctrine, the court may order that the entire 
trust be disregarded as if it had never existed. 
 
The courts both local and foreign had over the years refined this doctrine and the meaning 




 case, Innes CJ described a simulated transaction as: 
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“a transaction is in fraudem legis when it is designedly disguised so as to escape the provisions of 
the law, but falls in truth within these provisions. Thus stated, the rule is merely a branch of the 
fundamental doctrine that the law regards the substance rather than the form of things – a doctrine 
common, one would think, to every system of jurisprudence and conveniently expressed in the 
maxim plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur.” 
 
The court in Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers and Hudson Ltd,
102
 
dealt with the application of simulated transaction doctrine and held as follows: 
“…The parties to it do not really intend to have, inter partes, the legal effect which its terms convey 
to the outside world. The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by concealing what is the real 
agreement or transaction between the parties. The parties wish to hide the fact that the real 
agreement or transaction falls within the prohibition or  is subject to the tax, and so dressed it up in a 









In the United Kingdom case of Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd,
105
 Lord Devlin said: 
“When a court of law finds that the words which the parties have used in a written agreement are not 
genuine, and are not designed to express the real nature of the transaction but for some ulterior 
purpose to disguise it, the court will go behind the sham front and get at the reality”. 
 
In the Australian case of Sharment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy
106
 Lockhart J 
defined a sham as: 
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“A sham is for the purposes of Australian law, something that is intended to be mistaken for 
something else or that is not really what it purports to be. It is a spurious imitation, a counterfeit, a 
disguise or a false front. It is not genuine or true, but something made in imitation of something else 
or made to appear to be something which it is not. It is something which is false or deceptive […] 
important to this description is the idea that the parties do not intend to give effect to the legal 
arrangements set out in their apparent agreement, understood only according to its terms. In 
Australia, this has become essential to the notion of sham, which contemplates a disparity between 
the ostensible and the real intentions of the parties. The courts must therefore test the intentions of 
parties, as expressed in documentation, against their own testimony on the subject (if any) and the 
available objective evidence tending to show what that intention really was”. 
 
The question of whether Lord’s Tomlin remark in the case of Duke of Westminster,
107
 as 
outlined hereunder, is in conflict with the substance versus form doctrine has also been 
addressed by our courts. 
“Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate 
Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, 
then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow-taxpayers may be 
of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax”. 
 
Innes J’s in his judgment in Zandberg v Van Zyl
108
 held the following: 
“But the words of the rule indicate its limitations. The court must be satisfied that there is a real 
intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention. For if the parties in 
fact mean that a contract shall have effect in accordance with its tenor, the circumstances, that the 
same object might have been attained in another way will not necessarily make the arrangement 
other than it purports to be. The enquiry, therefore, is in each case one of fact, for the right solution 
of which no general rule can be laid down”. 
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It was also explained in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, 
Brothers & Hudson Ltd
109
 that:  
“[a] transaction is not necessarily a disguised one because it is devised for the purpose of evading 
the prohibition in the Act or avoiding liability for the tax imposed by it. A transaction devised for 
that purpose, if the parties honestly intend it to have effect according to its tenor, is interpreted by 
the court according to its tenor, and then the only question is whether, so interpreted, it falls within 
or without the prohibition or tax”. 
 
In the case of Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR,
110
 Hefer JA, with reference to the above cited 
cases, explained that a disguised transaction in essence is a dishonest transaction, in as 
much as the parties to it do not really intend it to have, the legal effect which its terms 
convey to the outside world. The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by concealing the 
real transaction, to hide the fact that their real agreement falls within the prohibition. 
 
The principles of the aforementioned cases were fully applied in the Conhage
111
 case, in 
deciding whether lease and sale back agreements were a simulated transaction. Under this 
scheme, the taxpayer was entitled to deduct the lease payments under S 11(a) of the ITA as 
the asset was in fact owned by the financial institution and the taxpayer was merely renting 
those assets from them.  
 
The Commissioner on the other hand was of view that this transaction was simulated and 
the real intention of the taxpayer was to contract a loan with the financial institution and 
thus the taxpayer sought to deduct both the interest and capital portion of the loan under S 
11(a) of the ITA. The court was satisfied that the real intention of the parties were in fact to 
abide by the lease and sale back agreement to raise finance for their expansion project. 
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Thus the said agreements were entered in a bona fide business transaction although tax 
motive was one of the main purposes. The result thereof was that the common law doctrine 
could not be applied to the agreements in issue, as there were no disguised transactions. 
 
3.7.1 Examples where the court has pierced the trust due to improper 
 administration (Sham Trusts) 
 
(I) In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker112 the trustees abused their 
powers and acted in contravention to the charter of the trust, i.e. the trust deed. The trust 
deed in this case provided that there should be a minimum of three trustees at all material 
times. When one trustee resigned the remaining trustees failed to appoint a third one and 
furthermore the two trustees had entered into agreements with Land and Agricultural Bank 
of South Africa, whereby assets of the trust were given as surety to obtain a substantial 
loan in favour of associated companies of their family business. The Parkers defaulted on 
their loan repayments and the bank sought to sequestrate the Parkers and the trust. The 
Parkers contended that two trustees alone could not bind the trust as the trust deed 
provided for a minimum of three trustees in office and thus the two trustees acting alone 
did not have the authority to bind the assets of the trust and therefore the sequestration 
order should be set aside. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that that the two trustees had lacked the capacity to 
bind the trust in favour of the bank in the first place. However, following a sequestration 
order against Parker, his trusteeship was automatically terminated in terms of a clause in 
the trust deed.  Nevertheless, Parker signed the trust’s petition to appeal in his purported 
capacity as a trustee.  It followed therefore that, based on the same principle of lack of 
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capacity the appeal to the full bench had been invalid and should have been struck from the 
roll.  There had therefore never been a valid appeal against the sequestration order, and it 
stood against the trust in favour of the bank. In delivering his judgment, Cameron JA 
expressed the following: 
“It may be necessary to go further and extend well-established principles to trusts by holding in 
a suitable case that the trustees’ conduct invites the inference that the trust form was a mere 
cover for the conduct of the business ‘as before’, and that the assets allegedly vesting in trustees 
in fact belong to one or more of the trustees and so may be used in satisfaction of debts to the 
repayment of which the trustees purported to bind the trust.  Where trustees of a family trust, 
including the founder, act in breach of the duties imposed by the trust deed, and purport on their 
sole authority to enter into contracts binding the trust, that may provide evidence that the trust 
form is a veneer that in justice should be pierced in the interests of creditors”.
113
 
The lesson to be learn from this case is that, failure to administrate the trust in terms of its 
charter and contravention to the Act
114
 could defeat the very purpose for which the trust 
has been created and the authorities may allow the trust to be pierced as though is never 
existed at first place. The other lesson to be learnt from a creditors point of view, is that it 
should never be assumed have trustees are acting within the boundaries of their powers as 
provided trust deed. 
 
(II) In the Badenhorst v Badenhorst
115
 case, the issue was when making a redistribution 
order in terms of S 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, the assets of an inter vivos 
discretionary trust created during the marriage must be taken into account. In deciding in 
favour of the appellant (Defendant), the SCA’s findings were that the respondent (Plaintiff) 
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has indeed treated the trust as his alter ego and it was evident that, but for the trust, 
ownership in all the assets would have vested in him. This decision has been reached based 
on the following salient facts as set out on Para 11 of the judgment: 
1. In conducting the affairs of the trusts, the plaintiff seldom consulted or sought the 
approval of his co-trustee, the was therefore in full control of the trust; 
2. He listed the trust assets as his own, in the application for credit facilities with the 
local co-operative; 
3. The liabilities in the form of bonds over the fixed property and then rental income 
from the buildings was also described as his; 
4. He insured a trust asset in his own name 
5. A property registered in the name of the plaintiff was financed by the trust; 
6. He received an income of R50 000 per month from an estate agency owned by the 
trust. 
 
(III) In the Airworld’s
116
 case, the sole member of two close corporations prompted the 
two close corporations to make substantial interest free loans to his family trust (a 
discretionary trust) to finance the purchase of assets. The CSARS viewed that the interest 
free loans were a disguise and accordingly assessed the two close corporations for STC in 
terms of Ss 64B and 64C of the ITA, as the Trust was a ‘recipient’ of amounts deemed to 
have been declared as dividends because the member of the close corporations, was a 
‘beneficiary’ of the Trust as contemplated by the definition of ‘recipient’ in S 64C(1)(c) of 
the ITA. 
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On the other hand, the respondents (taxpayers) contended that if regard is had to the 
definition of ‘beneficiary’ for the purposes of defining the expression ‘connected person’ 
in S 1 of the ITA, it appeared that the legislator intended to draw a distinction between a 
beneficiary who had a vested right to claim benefits from a trust and a beneficiary in 
respect of whom the trustees had a discretion to confer benefits and where the word was 
used without any qualification, it should be assumed that it was used in the sense of a 
‘beneficiary with a vested right’ as in a discretionary trust the beneficiary was only a 
‘potential beneficiary’ until the trustees had exercised their discretion and decided to make 
a payment to him or grant him some other benefit out of the trust. 
The SCA have had a clear view of the taxpayers’ mischief and ruled that the trust was a 
beneficiary within the meaning of S 64C. In arriving to that conclusion, the SCA had 
examined closely the control and influence of the founder (and also the sole member of the 
two close corporations) over the trust and the other trustees. In delivering his judgment, 
Hurt AJA stated the following: 
“The striking feature of it, in relation to this case, is that the only conceivable beneficiaries are 
Retief, his spouse and their descendants. All of these beneficiaries fall squarely within the ambit of 
sub-s 64C(1)(c). This is accordingly not a type of trust in which the trustees have a discretion to 
benefit anyone other than ‘recipients’ as defined in the subsection. The authority of Retief plainly 
pervades the trust. His co-trustee, Mr JD Coetzee, acknowledged in the course of his evidence that 
Retief is a headstrong man who ignores advice if it doesn't suit his wishes. Both his co-trustees are 
employed by Retief and, indeed, the evidence was that the Coetzee family had been employed as 
accountants and auditors of the Retief family businesses since the mid 1950’s. The circumstances 
are strikingly similar to those outlined in Badenhorst v Badenhorst  (2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para 10 
and 11). For all practical purposes a payment to the Trust is equivalent to a payment to Retief, for he 
has the power to direct its ultimate destination. It would, in my view, be ludicrous for the 

















pay any amount out of the trust to any of the beneficiaries, to avoid liability for STC. Such a result 
would fly in the face of the legislators clear intention”.
117
 
3.8  A comparison between the old GAAR and the new GAAR 
  
(a)  Transaction, operation or scheme 
The terms ‘transaction, operation or scheme’ as contained in the repealed S 103(1) of the 
ITA, have also been incorporated in the new GAAR under the definition of ‘arrangement’ 
in S 80L of the ITA and should retain its previous interpretation from our courts.
118
 
However, the two main differences from its predecessor are the followi g: 
(1)  That it is not a requirement for any such transaction, operation or scheme to be 
legally  enforceable in order to fall within the ambit of Ss 80A and 80L of the ITA, the 




(2)  That the term ‘arrangement’ includes all steps in the ‘transaction, operation or 
scheme’ or parts thereof and by virtue of the powers conferred to CSARS by virtue of S 
80H of the ITA, the latter may apply GAAR to any steps or parts within the ‘transaction, 
operation or scheme’. This approach was developed in UK where Lord Brightman had 
observed the following: 
"The fact that the court accepted that each step in a transaction was a genuine step producing its 
intended legal result-did not confine the court to considering each step in isolation for the purpose 
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This requirement may have far reaching consequences on the ‘purpose’ requirement as it 
seeks to override established case law
121
 in South Africa wherein the courts would look at 
the transactions as a whole, as opposed to the individual steps contained therein and thus 
the taxpayer was able to show that there was an overriding non-tax reason for the 
conclusion thereof.
122
  The CSARS would thus be able to apply the provisions of the new 
GAAR to the ‘single’  step, which has for the sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax 
benefit and ignoring the purpose of the overall arrangement. 
 
Silke in paragraph 19.4, using the precedent in the case FCT v Newton,
123
 defines that an 
“‘arrangement’ requires a conscious involvement of two or more participants who arrive at 
an understanding. It cannot exist in a vacuum and presupposes a meeting of minds, which 
embodies an expectation as to future conduct between the parties, that is, an expectation by 
each that the other will act in a particular way”. The implication of the above statement 
indicates that all parties to an arrangement must be in agreement or reach a consensus with 




(b) The sole or main purpose requirement  
The sole or main purpose requirement is fundamental in both the old and new GAAR, if 
the sole or main purpose of entering a transaction, operation or scheme was motivated by 
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reasons other than tax benefits, S 103(1) of the ITA could not be applied
125
 and same 
principles would seemingly still apply in the new GAAR.  
 
Previously in determining the purpose requirement of a particular transaction, operation or 
scheme, our courts had adopted a subjective approach where much reliance were placed on 





It is submitted that under the new provision of S 80A, in determining the purpose 
requirement, there is a shift from the subjective approach to an objective approach whereby 
if the effect of such transaction, operation or scheme, results in a tax benefit, it will be 
presumed that such transactions (or part therein as defin d in S 80L of the ITA) had been 
entered with the sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit in terms of S 80G of the 
ITA.
127
 The ‘effect’ approach has also been favoured over the ‘purposive or choice’ 




If such a new approach is adopted by our courts, it would nullify the ‘choice’ principles as 
formulated by our courts
129
 and also by the Canadian courts.
130
 Therefore under such an 
interpretation, the taxpayer will be under a tremendous disadvantage as it would be very 
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difficult to discharge the burden as imposed under S 80G (previous equivalent was S 
103(4)) of the ITA).
131
 It is also worth to be noted that such an interpretation of GAAR has 





A taxpayer who enters in a transaction to acquire an investment flat by the interposition of 
a trust; therefore instead of purchasing the immovable property on his own name, he opts 
to set up and inter-vivos trust, in which he is one of the trustees and also one of the 
beneficiaries. The taxpayer then lends a sum of money to the trust to purchase the property.  
 
The first enquiry is to determine under both the old and new GAAR whether a ‘tax benefit’ 
is derived under the ‘arrangement’ in issue. The tax benefit in this issue is the anticipated 
tax liability
133
 at death of the donor/founder to the trust (CGT and estate duty). 
 
On the strength of the Conhage
134
 case, such an arrangement would not meet the ‘sole or 
main purpose requirement’ under the previous S 103(1) of the ITA as the taxpayer’s main 
purpose to enter the series transactions as outlined above, was to purchase an immovable 
property and not to obtain a tax benefit. 
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Since the ambit of the provisions of the new GAAR is very wide, the above ‘arrangement’ 
may thus take a different shape, taking into consideration the definition of ‘arrangement’ in 
S 80L and also to the powers conferred to the CSARS in S 80H. It is further submitted that 





 whereby if the taxpayer could show an overriding non-





Therefore under the new provisions, whenever a ‘tax benefit’ is achieved viewed in an 
objective perspective, it will then be presumed under S 80G of the ITA, that its sole or 
main purpose is to avoid tax, the Commissioner may then subject part or all of the 
‘composite arrangement’ that results in a ‘tax benefit’ to GAAR if the taxpayer does not 
discharge the onus as imposed on him by S 80G of the ITA. The taxpayer would need to 
advance satisfactory reasons, which will then be tested against the surrounding facts and 
circumstances of the case to discharge that onus. On a closer analysis, it would seem that 
CSARS interpretation of the purpose requirement is that whenever an ‘arrangement’ 
results in a tax benefit, the purpose requirement will be satisfied if same results could be 
achieved in a non-tax saving arrangement. (In this example, the set up of a testamentary 
trust). Hence the ‘arrangement’ may fall under the first requirement of GAAR namely the 
‘sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit’. 
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(c) Tainted Elements 
The tainted elements that prevailed under the old GAAR
138
 were the normality or 
abnormality of the transactions, operation or scheme in issue, having regards to both a 
business and non-business context. In order to establish whether a person is conducting a 
business is a factual enquiry as described by Wessels J in the Modderfontein
139
 case. 
Previously in assisting the CSARS in discharging its onus to prove the normality 
requirement,
140
 there was the indicative test of ‘rights and obligation created under 
transactions dealt at arm’s length’. 
 
The terms ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ were not defined in the ITA and therefore have to 
take precedence on case laws.
141
 In establishing the normality of a transaction there are no 
predetermined set of rules that can be applied, the courts have applied the context of the 
transactions, operation or scheme in issue to the particular facts and circumstances of the 
case. It was established that in an event where a transaction has been dealt at arm’s length, 
the transaction would more likely be ‘normal’ than ‘abnormal’ since the parties involved 




The above concepts have been retained in the new GAAR; the normality and abnormality 
requirement in a business context is now covered by S 80A(a) and in a context other than a 
business is covered in S 80A(b) of the ITA.  
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However, the tainted elements tests have further been expanded under the new GAAR with 
the introduction of an additional three more  tainted ‘elements’ tests namely, the 
commercial substance test,
143
 the non- arm’s length transaction test
144
 and the misuse and 
abuse test.
145
 The commercial substance test is further expanded in a list of non exhaustive 
indicative test as provided in Ss 80C, 80D and 80E of the ITA. 
 
(d) Lack of commercial substance 
It would seem that it was the legislature’s intention to codify the doctrine of substance 
versus form, by the insertion of S 80C, the explanation given by the treasury of this 
insertion is that these provisions draw upon precedent in both the United Kingdom and the 
United States and would adopt what the House of Lords has referred to as an 
“unblinkered” approach to complex multi-step “composite transactions”. It seeks to expand 




(i) Round Trip Financing 
The round trip financing concept has been introduced in the South African GAAR under S 
80D of the ITA; it is an indicative element of the presence of a ‘lack of commercial 
substance’. The meaning thereof is where funds are transferred from one source and takes 
a ‘journey’ to some other recipients and back again to its original source. The term ‘round 
trip financing’ had been considered in the UK, where Lord Wilberforce
147
 made the 
following remarks: 
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“although sums of money, sometimes considerable, are supposed to be involved in individual 
transactions, the taxpayer does not have to put his hand in his pocket: see Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v. Plummer [1980] A.C. 896 and Chinn v. Hochstrasser. The money is provided by 
means of a loan from a finance house which is firmly secured by a charge on any asset the taxpayer 
may appear to have, and which is automatically repaid at the end of the operation.” 
 
Applying the above concept in a context involving a trust, whereby the donor’s attempt to 
circumvent the trap of Para 12(5) on deemed waiver of loan on donations. The donation 
can be structured in a manner in which cash is donated instead of a waiver of loan account, 
as the definition of “asset” in Para 1 specifically excludes any currency. Trust income or 
capital, in cash can be utilised by the trust to repay the loans to the founders of the trust. 
The founders/donors can thereafter donate the cash of R100,000 each to the trust. This 
donation will be exempt from donations tax in terms of S 56(2)(b) of the ITA and there 
will be a further tax benefit of R 20,000 on avoidance of CGT by the trust.  In this 
circumstance the arrangement may be regarded as a round trip financing and thus fall 
within the ambit of S 80D of the ITA. 
 
However, from the wording as contained in provisions in Ss 80A(a) and 80D, it would 
seem that the round trip financing can only apply in a business context. A further enquiry 
would therefore need to be undertaken to determine whether the trust is trading
148
 and 




(ii) Elements that have the effect of cancelling each other 
This indicative test, as provided in S 80C(b)(iii) originates from S 245(4) of the Canadian 
ITA and from the British doctrine of ‘fiscal nullity’ which has been interpreted in the 
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Furniss v Dawson’s case
150
 as a planned series of transactions which has the effect of 
cancelling each other purely to avoid tax.   
 
In a context of transaction(s) involving trust(s), the above provisions could be triggered or 
in a situation whereby donors to a trust attempt to offset capital gain attributed by the trust 
to them in their capacity as beneficiaries against the capital loss incurred as a result of the 
waiver of loan
151
 in their capacity as donors/ creditors.  
 
(iii) Accommodating or tax –indifferent parties  
It may further be contended by the fiscus that the transaction in (ii) above, is also designed 
to accommodate a connected party
152
 (the trust) to reduce its tax and thus invoke S 80F of 
the ITA to remedy the status quo. 
 
(iv) Arm’s Length Transaction test 
The arm’s length transaction test is a concept that existed in the old S 103(1) and was 
considered in the Hicklin’s
153
 case, which held that transactions dealt at arm’s length will 
more likely exhibit the ‘normality’ requirement since the parties involved will each seek to 
achieve the maximum gain therein. 
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In the new GAAR most of the wording from the old S 103(1) has been retained in the ITA, 
save for the following phrase “under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of 
the transaction, operation or scheme in question” which has been deleted. It would seem 
that the deletion of the above phrase would serve to nullify the following orbiter of Trollip 
JA
154
 “what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the 
entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case may be abnormal in an 
agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such 
circumstances.” In the Geustyn’s
155
 case, in determining whether it was abnormal not to 
deal at ‘arm’s length’, Ogilvie-Thompson CJ stressed the fact that the relationships 
between the parties involved in the transactions have to be given due consideration and the 




The consequence of the amendment to the ‘arm’s length’ transaction test may be that the 
surrounding facts, circumstances, and relationships between parties entering a transaction 
not entered into at arm’s length may be disregarded by the CSARS, and thus fall within the 
ambit of S 80A if such transaction also meets the ‘sole or main purpose’ requirement.  
 
In a context of transactions involving an inter-vivos trust, whereby, a founder sells an 
immovable property on loan account to the trust, at a price significantly below market-
related price, the following fundamental issues regarding S 80A would require due 
consideration: (Whilst this transaction will trigger both an application of donations tax on 
the gratuitous portion of the sale and also CGT in the hands of the founder) 
I.  Is the freezing of assets a transaction which has for the sole or main purpose of 
 reducing or avoiding tax liability (CGT and estate duty)? 
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II. Will the sale of an asset on loan account at a price significantly below the market 
price be regarded as non arm’s length transaction as contended in S 80A(c)(ii) of 
the ITA? 
III. Will the new wording of the ‘arm’s length transaction’ test as contained in the new 






(e) Misuse and abuse of the Act 
The misuse and abuse of the Act is governed by S 80A(c)(ii) of the ITA and has been 
drawn from S 245(4) of the Canadian ITA and it applies in both a business and non 
business context. The purpose of this provision is also to remedy the weaknesses of the 
abnormality requirement.
159
 It is submitted that this provision is an alternative to the 
abnormality requirement, therefore if a transaction has for sole or main purpose of 
obtaining and tax benefit and there is also a misuse and abuse of the act, then S 80A of the 
ITA is applicable.
160
 It is also submitted that the onus to prove that a transaction is abusive 




The guidelines for i terpreting this provision are found in the Canada Trusto
162
 case, 
which was subsequently re-affirmed in later Canadian case of Antle v The Queen.
163
 It was 
held that the significance of this provision is that it will not deny a tax benefit where ‘it 
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may reasonably be considered that the transactions were carried out in a manner consistent 
with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions of the Act as interpreted textually, 
contextually and purposively’. 
 
Applying the principles and the facts of the Antle’s
164
 case (trust and attribution rules) to a 
South African context; the taxation of trust income is governed by S 25B of the ITA and 
this section is subject to provisions as contained in S 7 of the ITA. The purpose of these 
provisions is aimed effectively at preventing parties to a trust to split or divest their income 
thereby reducing their tax liabilities, which is the real spirit, objective and purpose of these 
provisions. Therefore where there is anything contrary to S 7 of the ITA, the CSARS may 
invoke S 80A(c)(ii). (Notwithstanding the fact that trust income is already subject to 
‘specific anti-avoidance rules’ CSARS may also apply GAAR by virtue of S 80I of the 
ITA.) 
 
The purposive approach as mentioned by McLachlin CJ,
165
 which is likely to be adopted 
by our courts, to positively apply this provision of the ITA, would be in circumstances 
where a taxpayer artificially creates a series of transactions to fall under certain provisions 




3.9  Chapter Conclusion  
 
It is evident that the new GAAR has a very wide application and may bring certain 
transactions, which could previously not be attacked under the previous S 103(1), within 
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its ambit. SARS interpretation thereof is very aggressive, although foreign courts have 
disagreed with similar interpretations in their jurisdiction. Thus until a Court ruling is 
obtained on its interpretation and application there will be an uncertainty. In the next 
chapter, the practical transactions which could previously escape S 103(1) will be tested 



















The selected tax planning tools involving trusts and its application to GAAR 
   
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the selected common tax planning tools involving the interposition 
of a trust. These selected tax planning tools, allows the taxpayer to minimise estate duty, 
capital gains tax, donations tax and also in some instances income tax. These schemes will 
then be tested against the old and new GAAR and will be outlined in the form of scenarios/ 
examples. 
4.2 The use of inter-vivos discretionary trust to minimise estate duty 
4.2.1 Scenario A 
Mr. A. aged 34 years of age, married in community of property, forms a discretionary 
inter-vivos trust; the trustees of the trust are himself, his wife and his accountant, as 
independent trustee. The income and capital beneficiaries of the trust are himself, his wife 
aged 30 and the two minor children. On 1 March 2010, the trust purchased a holiday house 
in Hermanus, for an amount of R3.5 million. The purchase was financed by an interest free 
loan of R1.5 million, advanced to the trust by the founder. The balance of R2 million was 
financed by a financial institution at the prime lending rate over a period of 10 years. Mr. 
A advanced an additional loan of R330,000 to the trust to settle the transfer duty, 
attorney’s cost on transfer and bond registration costs. The trust does not have any income 
and therefore, Mr. A. having given personal guarantee for the bond, has to settle the 
monthly repayment of bond amounting to R26 500. Mr. A is also the sole shareholder of a 

















million. On the advice of his accountant, Mr A. sold all his shares to the trust on loan 
account at market value and the loan is interest free.  Mr and Mrs. A. further executed a 
joint will, whereby upon their death, they will bequeath the outstanding loan amount to the 
trust. It is further understood that both Mr. A and Mrs. A would take advantage of S 
56(2)(b) of the ITA to donate an amount of R100,000 each to the trust every year to reduce 
the loan account. Following the above transactions the financial position of the trust is as 
follows: 
ASSETS     
 Fixed Properties    3,500,000  
 Plus Capitalised cost      330,000  
 Total Fixed Properties     3,830,000 
 
 
Shares in Private Company 10,000,000  
    13,830,000  
     
EQUITY and LIABILITIES 
Capital     
 Trust Capital      200,000  
Liabilities    
 Loan Mr. A - founder   5,815,000  
 Loan Mrs A- founder's wife   5,815,000  
 Loan Financial Institution   2,000,000  


















4.2.2 The tax implications 
4.2.2.1 Transfer duty 
Transfer duty is payable in terms of Section 2 TDA on the value of the property acquired 
by a person. The rate at, at which a trust pays transfer duty, is a flat rate of 8 % of the 




On the other hand, a natural person pays transfer duty on a progressive rate, which is 
determined by the purchase price of the property acquired, as detailed hereunder:
168
 
 0 % on the first R 500,000 of the purchase price 
 Plus 5 % on the next R 500, 000 of the purchase price 
 Plus 8 % on the excess of the purchase price over R 1 million 
 
Therefore there is an adverse transfer duty consequence for Mr. A in buying the property 
through the vehicle of a trust as the transfer duty payable by the latter amounts to 
R280,000 as compared to R225,000, if the property had been bought by himself or jointly 
with his spouse. 
4.2.2.2 Securities Transfer Tax 
The sale of shares from Mr. A to the family trusts is subject to STT in terms of S 2(1) of 
the STT Act. The STT payable by the trust on the transfer of the shares from the founder to 
the trust is levied at 0.25 % of the selling price of the shares, which amounts to R25,000. It 
is worth noting that if shares are not transferred at their market value, the difference 
between the value attached to the shares and the fair market value will represent a donation 
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4.2.2.3 Donations Tax 
The writing off of a loan in favour of a trust will fall under the definition of “donation”
170
 
as outlined in S 55 of the ITA. This transaction will also trigger a CGT event by virtue of 
Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA, which will be further discussed in the next 




 case, the Appellate Division held that in order for the element of donation to 
be present in a transaction, the disposition must be motivated by pure liberality or 
disinterested benevolence and not by self-interest or the expectation of a quid pro quo of 
some kind from whatever source it may come.  
 
However, S 56(2)(b) of the ITA provides that the sum of the values of all property 
disposed under donations by a natural person which does not exceed R100,000 during any 
year of assessment, shall be exempt from donations tax. 
 
Therefore using the exempting provision of S 56(2)(b), Mr. A and his spouse can each 
write off  an amount of R100,000 per annum of the amount owed to them by the trust. The 
combined tax benefit on donations tax per annum is therefore R40,000 (20 % of R200, 
000). 
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It will take 59 years of tax assessments for Mr A and his spouse to write off the initial loan 
of R5,815,000 each, advanced to the trust. The average life expectancy of a 34 year old 
male is 68 years and 75 years for a 30 year old female.
172
 Therefore at the time of death of 
one of the spouses, it is highly probable that the loan account to the trust will not be 
extinguished using the exempting provision of S 56(2)(b) of the ITA.   
 
In this example, the spouses had drafted a joint will whereby there will be a bequest of the 
outstanding loan account to the trust.  Such a bequest will result in capital gains tax as a 
“waiver”.
173
  Such disposal could result in as much as a 20% effective tax in the hands of 
the Trust.   
 
Bequest of the loan to the trust by the testatrix could also have a donations tax implication.  
This impact was brought before the court in ITC 1793.
174
 It is submitted that the provisions 
of Part V of the ITA may have implications for the creditor, in this case the testatrix, who 
has waived a debt owed by a debtor, the trust.  Donations tax is levied on the value of the 




In a later case, ITC 1835,
176
 the court had to again decide whether a bequest of a loan 
account to an inter-vivos trust was subject to Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA. 
In this case, the inter vivos trust was the sole heir of the residue of the estate of the testatrix 
and her husband who had executed a joint will, the residue of the estate being subject to 
usufruct in favour of the survivor of them for the duration of their life and thereafter to 
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their son for a year. The joint will also provided that the first-dying spouse would bequeath 
various assets, such as household possessions, to the survivor of them and the residue of 
the estate of the first-dying was left to the trust subject to the usufruct. The trust, at the time 
of the testatrix's death, was indebted to her on a loan account which fell into the residue of 
the estate. 
 
In his judgment, Locock J, held that the intention of the testators was clear, namely, that 
the residue of the estate was bequeathed to the trust as the sole heir thereof, subject to the 
usufruct in favour of the surviving spouse and the son and the meaning of the word 
‘residue' is well known when used in the context of a testamentary disposition. Therefore, 
Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA could not be applied. 
 
The fundamental difference in this case, in contrast with ITC 1793
177
 was that the wording 
in the joint will did not classify the trust as a legatee but as the sole heir of the testatrix. It 
is submitted that that a legacy is a specific sum of money or asset which a testator 
bequeaths to a person known as a legatee. The legatee differs from an heir under a will in 
that an heir is the person who succeeds to the residue of the estate after all debts, costs of 




It is submitted that a possible solution to the problem raised in ITC 1793,
179
  is that the 
loan account owed by the trust could be bequeathed to another legatee, e.g.  the surviving 
spouse or another trust. Alternatively, for the deceased to detail in the will that all debts 
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due shall be discharged in full, the trust could then be left an amount of money to settle the 
debt that is due to it.
180
  
4.2.2.4 Capital Gains Tax 
4.2.2.4.1 The sale of shares in the private company  to the trust 
In order for a transaction to trigger a CGT event, the so called four building blocks must be 
present, namely, “disposal”, “asset”, “proceeds” and “base cost”. 
 
The shares in the private company, owned by Mr. A in the above example is an asset as 
contemplated in Para 1 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA and the subsequent sale of these 
shares to the trust is a disposal as contemplated in Para 11(1) (a). The proceeds of  
R 10 million whilst on loan account is regarded as having been accrued to the seller as 
stipulated in Para 35. The base cost of the shares shall be determined in accordance to Part 
V of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA. 
 
Since Mr A is married in community of property and the said shares is not excluded from 
their communal estate, in terms of Para 14 of the Eighth Schedule, the capital gain from the 
disposal of the shares shall be apportioned in equal proportion between Mr. A and his 
spouse. They will then be both entitled to an annual exclusion of R 20,000 in terms of Para 
5. The taxable capital gain for both individual shall be 25 percent of the net capital gain as 
provided in Para 10. This amount shall then be included in their taxable income in terms of 
S 26 A of the ITA. 
 
4.2.2.4.2 CGT on donations to the trust 
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Using the exemption provision of S 56(2)(b), Mr. A and his spouse can each write 
off  (donate) an amount of R100,000 per annum of the amount owed to them by the trust.  
However, such waiver of debt could result in a capital gain for the trust.  
  
The term ‘donation’ is defined in S55 of the ITA “as any gratuitous disposal of property including 
any gratuitous waiver or renunciation of a right” and the word ‘property’ as “any right in or to property 
movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, wheresoever situated.” This definition of property is 
wide enough to include a loan amount receivable and furthermore, it can be argued that in 
terms of S 58(1) of the ITA, the waiver of a debt is a disposal for no or inadequate 
consideration and is thus a deemed donation. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the term ‘donation’ is not d fined in S 1 of the ITA, does not 
mean that the legislature had the intention that should bear a different meaning for the 
purposes of other parts of the ITA where the term ‘donation’ is used. 
 
Marais JA in his judgment in the Welch’s case held that in order for an element of donation 
to be present for the purposes of S 55 of the ITA, the disposition must be motivated by 
pure liberality or disinterested benevolence and not by self-interest or the expectation of a 






 case, the court had defined the terms ‘donation, settlement or other 
disposition,’ in delivering his judgment, Trollip JA defined the word donation as when 
 “the donor disposes of the property gratuitously out of liberality or generosity, the donee being 
thereby enriched and the donor correspondingly impoverished, so much so that, if the donee gives 
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any consideration at all therefore, it is not a donation It can therefore be regarded as a unilateral 
contract in the sense that the donor is the only party upon whom any obligation lies”.
183
 
The learned judge also described the term ‘settlement’ in starting that:  
“ In a ‘settlement’ the property is usually disposed of upon specific terms and conditions, set out in a 
deed of settlement, to or through the medium of a trustee or trustees for the benefit of some person, 
or for the benefit of persons in succession as in a fideicommissum. As far as the beneficiaries are 
concerned a settlement is also generally made gratuitously out of liberality or generosity in the sense 
that no consideration usually passes from them to the settlor for the benefits conferred on them. 
‘Settlement’ is thus usually of the same genus as ‘donation’. It is probably separately mentioned in 





In regards to the term ‘other disposition’, Trollip JA, held that the ejusdem generis rule
185
 
has to be applied and therefore the term ‘other disposition’ should be read as ‘other similar 
disposition’ and so construed ‘dispositions’ as  
“means any disposal of property made wholly or to an appreciable extent gratuitously out of the 
liberality or generosity of the disposer. It need not flow from a unilateral contract, for that is not 
necessarily a common element of a ‘donation’ and ‘settlement’. That a ‘disposition’ need not be 
wholly gratuitous and is not restricted to any particular form of disposal of property differentiates it 
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In another case of Joss v SIR,
187
 the Court held that ‘other disposition’ cannot include 





Applying these above principles as had been laid by our courts, the waiver of a debt by a 
creditor (founder) for no commercial purpose whatsoever can be accepted to have been 
only motivated by liberality or generosity towards the trust, with no expectations in return 
(quid pro quo).  
 
On the other hand, the definition of “asset” in Para 1 of the Eighth Schedule, is wide 
enough to include a loan account receivable and this has never been challenged in our 
courts. In terms of deeming provisions of Para 12(5)(a)(i) and (b)(i), the debtor is deemed 
to have acquired the waived portion of the debt t a nil base cost and deemed to have 
disposed of the debt to the extent of the amount waived. This will result in a net capital 
gain of R200,000 for the trust arising from the waiver by both Mr and Mrs A. Each donor 
would then have a capital loss of the amount waived (i.e. R100,000 each).  It is also to be 
noted that not all waivers of loan will trigger the application of Para 12(5); in the case of 
assets sold to the trust on loan account by the founder(s), any subsequent waiver of the 
loan will result in the base cost of the asset being reduced by an amount equivalent to the 
waiver of the loan, as provided by Para 20(3)(b) of the Eighth Schedule. The waiver in turn 
does not trigger the application of Para 12(5) of the same schedule due to the exclusion 
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A trust being a non-natural person, any taxable gain included in its taxable income is 50 
percent, and since a trust, other than a special trust is taxed at a fixed rate of 40 percent, the 
tax payable by the trust on the annual waiver of the debt shall be R40,000 per annum. 
  
It is common practice for trusts to distribute any capital gains made by the trust to its 
resident natural person beneficiaries (provided the trustees are empowered to do so by the 
trust deed) in accordance with Para 80 of the Eighth Schedule, to minimise the tax 
liability.  However, Para 80 is subject to Paras 68, 69, 71 and 72 (the attribution 
paragraphs). 
  
The above attribution paragraphs have a mirror effect to that of S 7 of the ITA, as the 
capital gain on the underlying asset shall revert back to the donor of that asset if one of the 
Para is applicable. Its requirements for a successful application are also similar to S 7 in 
that there must be the element of “any donation, settlement or other disposition”
190
 present.  
  
In the example in discussion, Paras 68 and 69 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA should be 
visited as the beneficiaries to the trust, in addition to the founder, include the spouse and 
their minor children. Therefore the attribution of a capital gain arising from a waiver of 
debt shall be limited by virtue of these provisions since the element of ‘donation, 
settlement and other disposition’ is present. 
 
Para 68 of the Eighth Schedule has the same intended purpose of S 7(2) of the ITA. The 
purpose of this provision is thus to act as an anti-avoidance provision which aims at 
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 in splitting their capital gains, so as to be taxed at a lower marginal 
rate thereby reducing their combined tax liability.  
 
In the example, in discussion, the trust will have a net capital gain of R200,000 by virtue of 
Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA, on the annual donation by the donors. The 
capital gains can therefore not be attributed to one single spouse, in their capacity as 
beneficiary of the trust by virtue of provisions of Para 68. The capital gain would thus be 
taken into account in the calculation of the aggregate capital gain of the spouse making the 
donation and disregarded in the other spouse determination of his/her aggregate capital 
gain.  
 
The net effect is that the capital gain would have to b  attributed to the spouses in the 
proportion of their original separate donation to the trust in terms of S 56(2)(b).  
  
Having ascertained that the element of donation is present, the capital gain attributed to the 
other beneficiaries of the trust (the minor children) shall be subject to Para 69 and thus be 
disregarded in the computation of their aggregate capital gain and shall be taken into 
account in the parents computation of their aggregate capital gain.  
 
The result of these provisions will have the effect of a capital gain distributed by the trust 
to the two donors of R 100,000 each and also capital loss of R 100,000 as a result of the 
waiver of the loan. 
  
In order to determine whether the above capital gains and losses can offset each other, Para 
56 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA should be considered. Subsection 2 of this paragraph 
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allows the founder/doner to claim a capital loss in his hands in respect of the debt disposed 
of. The loss is not clogged (ring-fenced), since Para 56(2)
192
 applies despite Para 39 of the 
Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
 
SARS views that if the capital loss arises from the waiver of a loan to a trust, and the 
capital gain in the trust is attributed back to the ‘donor’ under Para 80(2),
193
 the creditor 
will not be able to claim the capital loss, since the capital gain will have been removed 
from the trust, and hence Para 56(2)(a)
194




However the above transaction has not been tested in our courts, should CSARS fail to 
prove that this transaction does not fall within the ambit of Para 56(2)(a),
196
the further 
enquiry  in this case would be whether reliance can be placed  on S 80C(2)(b)(iii), as an 
alternative to attack this scheme.  
 
It is also worth underlining that in order for the above transaction to achieve its desired 
results (the reduction of the founder’s loan to the trust without the consequence of Para 
12(5)), the trust would need to have sufficient cash to attribute the capital gains to the 
beneficiaries/ donors, otherwise if such attribution is effected on loan account it will defeat 
the purpose of the whole scheme. 
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The donors can further circumvent the trap of Para 12(5), if the donation is structured in a 
manner in which cash is donated instead of a loan account, as the definition of “asset” in 
Para 1 specifically excludes any currency.  The scheme in this example could be structured 
as follows: 
 
The shares purchased by the trust from the donors/ founders can yield dividend income, 
which is exempt from taxation in terms S 10(1)(k) of the ITA. This cash can be utilised by 
the trust to repay the loans to the founders of the trust. The founders/donors can thereafter 
donate the cash of R 200,000 each to the trust. This donation will still be exempt from 
donations tax in terms of S 56(2)(b) of the ITA. However, such an arrangement will yield a 
tax benefit of R 40,000 for donations tax for the donors and an avoidance of CGT for the 
trust of R 40,000. The total tax benefit will thus be R 80,000. The next enquiry which will 
be dealt in the next section is whether such a tr nsaction will fall within the ambit of  
S 80A(c)(ii) and S 80D of the ITA. It however is submitted that the fact that this 
arrangement is made in order to avoid CGT does not mean that it has to be treated as a 




4.2.2.4.3  At death of the founders/donors 
In terms of Para 40 of the Eighth Schedule, when a person dies, that person is deemed to 
have disposed of all his assets at market value and the deceased estate is deemed to have 
acquired these assets at the same value. However in terms of Para 5 of the same schedule, 
the deceased person will have an annual exclusion of R 200,000 instead of the normal  
R 20,000. 
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Therefore by divesting their assets to a discretionary inter-vivos trust, Mr. A and his spouse 
may save a substantial amount on CGT, as those assets would no longer be part of their 
communal estate. Assuming the trust is not in a position as in ITC 1793,
198
 otherwise Para 
12(5) of the Eighth Schedule would be applicable to the trust. 
4.2.2.5 Estate Duty 
A further advantage of donating assets or cash to an inter-vivos trust is that the estate of the 
person will decrease in value, therefore minimising estate duty at the time of death of the 
person. It is also to be noted that any loan accounts due by the trust shall constitute an asset 
in the hands of a person at the time of death and shall therefore be subject to estate duty. 
 
However, the loan may not increase in value, if it is interest-free, but immovable assets 
normally appreciate other time and value of shares in companies will depend on numerous 
factors. The disadvantage of an interest free loan to a trust by the donor is that it may 
constitute a continuous donation
199
 for the purposes of the attribution rules, namely an 
application of S 7 of the ITA and Paras 68, 69, 71 and 72 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
ITA. (E.g. if a person sells assets to a trust set up for the benefit of his minor children at 
fair market value but refrains from charging interest on the loan, the transaction is partly 
onerous and partly gratuitous). 
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4.2.3 Application of S 103(1) [old GAAR] 
4.2.3.1 The use of inter-vivos discretionary trust to minimise estate duty 
For the purpose of this section, the assumption is made that the trust has been formed 
before 02 November 2006 and the transactions as listed hereunder has also been processed 
before that date. 
 
(A) The purchase of the holiday house by the trust, financed by an interest free loan of 
R1.830 million from the founder and the balance of R2 million at prime lending rate from 
a financial institution. The loan repayment is being settled by the founders. 
     
Having already established that: (a) an avoidance of estate duty would constitute a ‘tax 
benefit’ under the now repealed S 103(7) of the ITA; and, (b) there would be an avoidance 
of CGT at the death of the founder as a secondary purpose, it would be necessary to apply 
the principles (as formulated by our courts) to establish whether or not the choice of using 
a trust for the purchase of the holiday house could fall within the ambit of the now repealed 
S 103(1). 
 
The taxpayer had entered into a transaction to purchase a holiday house, which may be 
used for enjoyment or as an investment or both, therefore the latter has not entered into this 
transaction for sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit.  The taxpayer’s right in 
choosing the most tax effective manner to structure his affairs, has been outlined by Lord 
Tomlin in the Duke of Westminster case.
200
 Following this principle, whenever there are 
multiple avenues to enter a transaction, the mere fact that the taxpayer has chosen the most 
tax advantageous one is insufficient for the Commissioner to invoke S103(1). The dual 
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purpose requirement was also outlined in the Conhage
201
 case, whereby it was held that 
SARS could not attack under S 103(1) of the ITA, if the main reason for entering into such 
transaction was business and commercially orientated. Therefore in this case the first 
requirement of S 103(1) of the ITA, which is the ‘sole or main purpose to obtain a tax 
benefit’ for a successful application of S 103(1), would fail. 
 
On the issue of whether this transaction is normal or abnormal, consideration has to be 
given as to whether or not the said transaction has created rights or obligations which 
would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm’s length transaction.  In this 
example the purchase of land by the trust was at arm’s length purchase. However is an 
interest free loan to the trust an abnormal transaction for the purpose of S 103(1) of the 
ITA?  
 
In the case of CIR v Louw,
202
 a firm of civil engineers decided to incorporate their 
partnership and an agreement was thus drawn to sell the partnership’s assets and goodwill 
to the newly incorporated company on interest free loan account. Thereafter, the company 
had also lent considerable sum of money to its directors.  
 
The Commissioner sought to attack the sale of assets of the partnership, including its 
goodwill, to the company on credit without requiring the payment of interest as abnormal 
with reference to the rights and obligations so created by the sale. 
 
In delivering his judgment, Corbett JA stressed the fact that in considering whether such as 
transaction is normal or abnormal, the relationship between the partners and the newly 
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incorporated company cannot be viewed in isolation otherwise the nature of the transaction 
cannot be given the proper effect for the purpose of S 103(1) of the ITA. The newly 
incorporated company has as shareholders the same partners and would hence be 
controlled by them. It was therefore held that such as transaction was not abnormal for the 
purpose of S 103(1) of the ITA. 
 
On the strength of the Louw
203
 case, by applying its principles as laid by Corbett JA, to this 
scenario in issue, the donors/founders are also the beneficiaries and the trustees and the 
trust would hence be partly controlled by them. This special relationship as defined by 
Corbett JA cannot be viewed in isolation and therefore the rights and obligations so created 
cannot be said to be abnormal for the purpose of S 103(1) of the ITA. 
 
(B) The sale of shares by the founders of an amount of R 10 million to the trust on 
interest free loan account.  This sale was done on the advice of the founder’s accountant to 
minimise their estate duty upon death. 
 
The sale of shares to the trust by the founders/donors at market related price can be 
classified as a transaction dealt at arm’s length. On the strength of the Hicklin
204
 case, 
although this transaction has been motivated by a ‘tax benefit’, which also includes estate 
duty by virtue of S 103(7) of the ITA, it will still escape the ambit of S 103(1), since the 
abnormality requirement is absent. The benefit of avoiding CGT upon death of the founder 
will also thus escape the ambit of S 103(1) as the transaction was dealt at arm’s length, 
based on the judgement of Hicklin. 
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(C) The use S 56(2)(b) of the ITA to donate an amount of R100,000 each to the trust 
every year to reduce the loan account 
 
In the case of CSARS v Woulidge,
205
 the taxpayer has set up two trusts for his minor 
children on loan account. Although the agreement of sale provided that the taxpayer could 
charge interest on the unpaid loan amount, he never exercised his right to charge interest. 
In the SCA, the CSARS sought to attack the whole transactions as a simulated transaction 
by suggesting that the sale actually consisted of a donation of the taxpayer’s shares to the 
trusts. However, due to the fact that it is not permissible to raise a new point on appeal in 
the circumstances where the opposing party did not have a proper opportunity to deal with 
that point at the earlier hearing, the SCA has therefore declined to entertain that point. The 
SCA has nonetheless acknowledged that the Commissioner’s case might have been 
conducted differently if the point had been raised earlier.  
 
This argument in this case may well be an indication that CSARS may unofficially view 
that a sale of asset to a trust on interest free loan account and the use of S 56(2)(b) of the 
ITA, to extinguish the loan account over a period of years may be attacked under the 
common law doctrine. To succeed the CSARS will have to prove that the real intention of 
the donors was to donate the whole amount to the trust and the interest free loan account 
was a mere disguise to conceal the real nature of the transaction to the real world in order 
to fall within the ambit of a particular provision of the ITA to escape the liability of tax.
206
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Therefore, in absence of a loan agreement between the trust and the donors/founders to 
specify the repayment terms, security/mortgage provisions and the succession of the loan 
account in the event of death of the donor,
207
 CSARS may have a strong case against the 
taxpayer on the substance versus form doctrine. 
 
It may be suggested that a possible solution to the above problem may be obtained through 
the scheme as outlined in the earlier section.
208
 However, SARS has warned that such a 
scheme can be attacked, by citing ITC 1583
209
 and ITC 1690
210





 the taxpayer had withdrawn funds from his practice in order to repay his 
bond which had been used to purchase his residence. H  then immediately increased the 
bond and paid the money back into his practice. The objective of the transaction was to 
change the purpose of the borrowing in order to make the interest deductible. The court 
disregarded the transaction holding that it had merely been carried out to secure a fiscal 
advantage. The reasoning derived from these cases, SARS argues that if the trust does not 
require cash, why donate cash to the trust otherwise to secure a tax benefit?
212
 
4.2.4 Application of Part IIA of the ITA (New GAAR) 
(A) The purchase of the holiday house by the trust, partially financed on an interest free 
loan account from the founder. 
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(a) Sole or main purpose requirement 
The issue of dual purpose of entering a particular transaction, the choice principle as 
outlined by Lord Tomlin in the Duke of Westminster
213
 case was re-affirmed in South 
Africa in the Conhage
214
 case. The doctrine as formulated by Lord Tomlin in the UK has 
been considered to be outdated with more recent cases in the same jurisdiction have 
departed from this doctrine as the complexity of transactions has evolved.
215
 It is also an 
accepted fact that the taxpayer is also not compelled by GAAR to choose a transaction 
which attracts the most tax to satisfy the Commissioner.
216
 It is clear that the financial 
planning in issue exhibits an arrangement
217
 which results in a ‘tax benefit’ (including 
anticipated tax benefit)
218
 exist, which then renders that arrangement an ‘avoidance 
arrangement’ as defined in S 80L. The next enquiry is to ascertain whether such avoidance 
arrangement has for its sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit. Since the presence of a 
tax benefit exists, in terms of S 80G, it will be presumed by CSARS that the avoidance 
arrangement was entered into solely or mainly to obtain a tax benefit.  To discharge that 
onus a ‘dual purpose’ requirement may not be sufficient as was the case in the previous S 
103(1), if the court interprets the new GAAR on an objective rather than subjective basis. 
Therefore, the taxpayer would have to provide overriding non tax reasons, which will have 
to be coherent to the particular facts and circumstances in issue, for entering such a 
transaction to escape the purpose requirement. (For example protection of assets against 
creditors or a family purpose). 
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(b)  Normality requirement in a business context 
The issue of whether the trust is conducting business will be a factual one,
219
 if the holiday 
accommodation is purely for enjoyment by the founder(s) and beneficiaries, it cannot fall 
within the ambit of S 80A(a). On the other hand, if the trustees decide to rent the property 
on a continuous basis (not once or twice), then there will be an indication that a business is 
being conducted and furthermore, the definition of ‘trade’ in S 1 of the ITA includes the 
letting of any property. In that instance S 80A(a) of the ITA would apply to the 
‘arrangement’.  
 
(c)  Normality requirement in a context other than business 
The principles of the Louw’s
220
case have been discussed in 4.2.2 above and therefore it 
may still stand for the purpose of S80 A (b) of the ITA as it can still be considered 
‘normal’ for a founder to grant a family trust an interest free loan to purchase an asset. 
However under the new GAAR, in addition to this test, there are more tainted indicators 
that can be applied in this particular transaction like S 80A(c)(i) and (ii) of the ITA. It has 
been suggested by CSARS that these other tainted elements test has the objective of 
addressing the shortcomings of normality requirement in the previous S 103(1) which is 
very similar to S 80A(b) of the ITA.  
 
Another test under S 80A(b), which the court can have recourse in assessing the normality 
of the transaction in issue, will be without doubt a ‘facts and circumstances’ approach
221
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which will encompass the manner in which the trusts has been managed and administered, 
as outlined earlier, to ascertain whether the trust is a ‘sham’ trust. 
 
(d) Rights and obligations created at arm’s length  





 are summarised hereunder: 
 That it connotes that each party is independent of the other and, in so dealing, will 
strive to get the utmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself.  
 
 That the said transaction in issue could not be viewed in isolation but should be 
viewed in the context of surrounding circumstances and the relationship between 
the parties involved. Therefore in such circumstances the court had implied that the 
standard of normality could be relaxed. 
 
Having regards to the new wording in S 80A(c)(i) of the ITA, the fundamental question 
that arises in this transaction in issue is whether an interest-free loan from a founder to his 
family trust has created a right that would not normally be created between persons dealing 
at arm’s length since it can now be implied that the relationship between the parties should 
be discarded. 
 
The test would hence be a comparison against a hypothetical transaction that is conducted 
as if they were unrelated, so that there is no question of a conflict of interest. In a 
transaction (between non-related parties), it would be very unlikely that a lender would 
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lend a significant sum of money interest free and unsecured to a borrower. Hence the 
transaction would be likely to exhibit rights and obligations that would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arm’s length and thus the transaction is tainted. CSARS 
has however indicated that despite of the new wording, surrounding circumstances will 
nonetheless be considered in determining the normality of the arrangement.
224
 CSARS 
interpretation can also not be accepted at face value as it cannot be assumed that the 
deleted words in S 80A have been omitted inadvertantly by the Legislature, the courts may 
seek to arrive at the real purpose of the new wording and apply the process as formulated 
in Airworld and another,
225




(e) Misuse and abuse of the Act 
This section applies to both a business and a non-business context and is considered to be 
an alternative or an addition to the normality test,
227
 in the sense that it remedies the 
weaknesses of the abnormality requirement.
228
 The issue whether there has been a misuse 
or abuse of the Act in this example, the CSARS must prove which particular provision(s) 
of the ITA has been misused or abused to obtain the tax benefit.  
 
The guidelines for a successful application of ‘misuse and abuse of the Act’ have been 
formulated by McLachlin C.J in the Canadian case of Canada Trustco
229
 are summarised 
hereunder: 
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 First, the courts must conduct a unified textual, contextual and purposive analysis of 
the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit in order to determine why they were put in 
place and why the benefit was conferred; 
 The goal is to arrive at a purposive interpretation that is harmonious with the provisions 
of the Act that confer the tax benefit, read in the context of the whole Act. 
 Second, the court must examine the factual context of the case in order to determine 
whether the avoidance transaction defeated or frustrated the object, spirit or purpose of 
the provisions in issue; 
 Whether the transactions were motivated by any economic, commercial, family or 
other non-tax purpose may form part of the factual context that the courts may consider 
in the analysis of abusive tax avoidance allegations under S 245(4). 
 Abusive tax avoidance may be found where the relationships and transactions as 
expressed in the relevant documentation lack a proper basis relative to the object, spirit 
or purpose of the provisions that are purported to confer the tax benefit, or where they 
are wholly dissimilar to the relationships or transactions contemplated by the 
provisions. 
 
In this instance it ca  be contended by the CSARS that the taxpayer has defeated and 
frustrated the object, spirit or purpose of Para 40 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA, as the 
object, spirit and purpose of Para 40 is to ensure that capital gains at death are taxed when 
property leaves the marital unit. It is to be noted that similar interpretation was reached in 
the Canadian case of Antle
230
 after applying the guidelines of McLachlin C.J.
231
 The focal 
point will thus be on the administration of the affairs of the trust as mentioned above for a 
factual enquiry whether the trust is a ‘sham trust’. 
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It has also been acknowledged that this provision creates an element of uncertainty and it 





(B) The sale of shares by the founders of an amount of R 10 million to the trust on 
interest free loan account 
 
(a) Sole or main purpose requirement 
The above transaction has been entered into solely to obtain a tax benefit,
233
 which is the 
avoidance of estate duty. The application of the ‘purpose’ requirement is still possible 
under GAAR as, despite the primary purpose was to avoid estate duty there may be an 




It is however worth underlining the fact that the issue, whether a tax benefit would be 
obtained by this transaction is uncertain, as the value of the shares can depend on a several 
economic factors. The extent of the ‘tax benefit’ may thus only be ascertained upon the 
death of the founder. 
 
In order for a transaction or part thereof to fall within the ambit of S 80A, the transaction 
must also fail the normality test, the commercial substance test or the misuse and abuse 
requirements. 
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(b)  Normality requirement in a business context 
As discussed earlier, the issue of whether the trust is conducting business would be a 
factual one,
235
 it is unlikely that S 80A(a) will be applicable since the trust is neither 
trading in shares nor conducting the business of investments.  
 
(c)  Normality requirement in a context other than business 
On the strength of the Louw’s
236
case, it would appear that for the purpose of S 80A(b) of 
the ITA as it can still be considered ‘normal’ for a founder to grant a family trust an 
interest free loan to purchase an asset.  
 
(d) Rights and obligations created at arm’s length  
Although the shares have been sold at market value, which indicates that this particular 
transaction has been dealt at arm’s length, the sale was however concluded on loan at an 
interest free. By virtue of the definition of ‘arrangement’ in S 80L, an ‘unblinkered 
approach’ to composite transactions is possible and therefore the Commissioner may 
dissect part of the composite transaction and subject part of it to S 80A(c)(i) of the ITA. 
The issue whether the interest free loan from a founder to a trust, creates rights and 
obligations that would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm’s length has 
been addressed earlier and may be seen as affirmative. It is however submitted that the 
interest free loan cannot be classified as abnormal as the founder may be gratuitous 




(e) Misuse and abuse of the Act 
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In order for this transaction to fall within the ambit of S 80A(c)(ii), the onus rests on the 
CSARS successfully prove which provisions of the ITA that has been misused and abused. 
It can here again be contended by the CSARS that this transaction was entered into to 
defeat and frustrate the object, spirit or purpose of Para 40 of the Eighth Schedule to the 





(f) The avoidance of estate duty 
The EDA does not contain any anti-avoidance provisions and S 80B of the ITA makes it 
very clear that provisions of GAAR in the ITA cannot apply to the EDA as well as they are 
two separate pieces of legislation.
239
 However, in a business context, if a transaction falls 
within S 80C, the remedy still available to the CSARS rests under S 80F(a) of the ITA 
under the ‘connected persons test’. Since the founder and the trust in this scenario are 
connected persons, as defined in S1 of the ITA the commissioner may disregard the trust 
and treat the founder (which is also a beneficiary of that trust) and the trust as one and the 
same person. Therefore for tax purposes it will be assumed that the trust never existed. 
Furthermore in such an e ent the CSARS will also be able to apply the Eighth Schedule 
upon death of the founder, thus any CGT which may have been avoided would be levied 
by CSARS. 
 
(C) The use of S 56(2)(b) of the ITA to extinguish the loan advanced by the 
founder/donor to the trust for the purchase of assets 
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It is common cause that the founder uses the annual exemption of R100,000 as provided in  
S 56(2)(b) of the ITA to extinguish their loan account to the trust to avoid donations tax. 
By virtue of S 80L, the avoidance of donations tax is covered by Part IIA of the ITA.  
 
As already discussed, in the new GAAR, whenever a tax benefit is obtained, it is presumed 
by S 80G of the ITA that such transaction has for its sole or main purpose to obtain a tax 
benefit, until proven otherwise by the taxpayer. The issue whether such transaction has as 
sole or main objective to obtain a tax benefit will depend on the surrounding facts and 
circumstances and does not automatically convert a donation to a trust as a sole or main 
objective to derive a tax benefit, but the onus will be on the taxpayer prove otherwise.  
 
CSARS may contend that this transaction is a sham or disguised transaction as the real 
intention of the founder/donor was to donate the assets to the trust and that the sale of these 
assets to the trust on loan account was a disguise. This approach was explained in 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Bros & Hudson Ltd
240
 which was quoted 
with approval by Hefer JA in the Ladysmith case.
241
  Consequently, it may further be 
advanced on behalf of the CSARS that there has been a misuse and abuse of the ITA as the 
taxpayer has disguised a donation in the form of a loan account to obtain the benefit of S 
56(2)(b) annually. 
 
On the other hand it may be contended on behalf of the taxpayer, on whom the onus rests, 
that the sale of shares and the loan advanced were genuine since CGT and STT were paid 
on the transaction of sale of shares. Furthermore the taxpayer has been impoverished by 
R100,000 following the donation. The taxpayer may have to prove that before entering this 
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transaction, he/she had considered whether his financial position do permit such a 
donation.  
 
In this example in issue, the prospect of the trust earning income, to repay the loan is 
highly probable, as the shares can yield dividend income and the purchase of the fixed 
property may yield rental income. In the event that there are no prospects of the trust 
generating income to repay that loan to the founder, it may be difficult for the latter to 
discharge the onus of proving that the funds advanced to the trust on loan account was not 
in fact a donation in real sense as there are no prospects of the loan to be ever repaid. 
 
As outlined in paragraph 4.2.2.4.2
242
 above, a donation to partially extinguish a loan (funds 
advanced to a trust to finance the purchase of an asset) will trigger a CGT event by virtue 
of Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA
243
 (a capital gain in the hand of the trust). 
In the same vein, by virtue of Para 56 (2)
244
 a capital loss occurs in the hands of the 
donors/founders in respect of the debt disposed of. The loss is not clogged (ring-fenced) in 
the hands of the donors/founders, since Para 56(2)
245
 applies despite Para 39 of the Eighth 
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It is here assumed that the donors had successfully taken advantage of Para 56(2)(a) to 
offset the capital gain attributed by the trust to them in their capacity as beneficiaries 
against the capital loss incurred as a result of the waiver of loan in their capacity as donors/ 
creditors. (It is to be noted that the capital gain attributed by the trust to the beneficiaries 
can be only in cash and cannot be attributed on loan account otherwise there will be no 
reduction in loan amount.) 
  
The further enquiry in this situation is whether CSARS can use S 80A of the ITA as an 
alternative to attack this scheme. This provision has a wide import and it thus be extremely 
onerous for the donors (who are equally trustees of that trust) to prove that the arrangement 
of attributing the trust capital to themselves (the donors) do not has for as sole or main 
purpose to obtain a tax benefit. In the event that this transaction falls under one of the 
tainted element, in this instance, provisions as provided by S 80A(a)(ii) read with S 80C, 
such a transaction would be classified as an impermissible tax avoidance arrangement. (S 
80 C can only apply in a business context). 
 
An indicative test of the lack of commercial substance which would be applicable in this 
instance would be found in S 80C(2)(iii) specifically targets elements that have the effect 
of offsetting or cancelling each other (provided that the transaction(s) in issue are in a 
business context). This provision originates from the British doctrine of ‘fiscal nullity’. In 
Furniss v Dawson,
247
 Lord Brightman formulated the following four steps or conditions 
must be satisfied before a series of transactions could be taxed as a composite transaction: 
 The series must be pre-ordained to produce a given result; 
 There must have been no purpose other than tax mitigation; 
                                                          
247

















 There was no practical likelihood that the events would not take place as planned; 
and 
 The events must have taken place. 
 
This provision is also found in S 245(4) of the Canadian ITA and has been interpreted by 
the Canadian courts such that these provisions will not apply in a situation where ‘it may 
reasonably be considered that the transactions in issue were carried out in a manner 
consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions of the Act, as interpreted 
textually, contextually and purposively’.
248
                                                          
 
The reasons given by the Treasury for the insertion of the provisions of the indicators to be 
present in S 80C is that promoters often seek to defeat the application of the GAAR in 
several ways. For example, they may try to use a bona fide business transaction as an 
excuse or camouflage for tax driven elements with little or no commercial substance. They 
may try to divide aspects of an impermissible avoidance arrangement among connected 
persons in order to give those individual aspects a semblance of commercial substance that 
they lack when they are viewed as a whole. Similarly, they may introduce accommodating 
or tax indifferent parties to achieve the same goal or to create an appearance of arm’s 
length dealing.249 
 
Silke is of view that this provision is targeted primarily at complex schemes, typically 
involving complex financial derivatives, which seek to exploit perceived loopholes in the 
law through transactions in which one leg generates a significant tax benefit while another 
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effectively neutralises the first leg for non-tax purposes.
250
 From that point of view it 
would seem that the indicative test of S 80C(2)(b)(iii) will be in affirmative in a pre-
ordained transaction. 
 
In the scenario in issue, the underlying issue is whether this transaction is pre-ordained. It 
has to be outlined earlier that by virtue of Paras 68, 69, 71 and 72 (the attribution 
paragraphs), the capital gain incurred by the trust as a result of the waiver of loan will be 
deemed to be those of the donor(s). Furthermore by virtue of paragraphs 39 and 56 of the 
Eighth Schedule to the ITA may not require the capital loss to be ring-fenced in the hands 
of the donors. 
 
It is worth noting here that for tax purposes the trust, donors, and its beneficiaries, although 
connected persons for the purpose of S 1 of the ITA, are nevertheless separate persons for 
the purpose of the same Act.
251
 If the donor discharges the onus of proving that the board 
of trustees in whom rests the power of distributing the capital gain of the trust and that he 
had no control over the decisions of that board of trustees and also caused no interference, 
then the transaction is unlikely to be preordained.  
 
Furthermore the trustees of the trust owe fiduciary duty to the trust and must act in the best 
interest of that trust. In the event that the capital gain of the trust arising from the donation 
made by its founders is not attributed to the selected beneficiaries, the trust will face a tax 
liability which is an economic outflow. Thus the attribution of the capital gain made, is in 
the interest of the trust and not in the interest of its founders. 
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Therefore as previously outlined in the Badenhorst
252
 case, the management of trust affairs 
is always of paramount importance. (E.g. the keeping of minutes of proceedings of the 
board of trustees, the exclusion of trustees who may have a vested interest in certain 
transactions pertaining to the trust, from casting a vote on that  particular matter). 
 
(D) Bequeath the remainder of loan to the trust, at death of the founder/donor to another 
legatee, e.g.  the surviving spouse or another trust, to avoid donations tax and Para 12(5) of 
the Eighth Schedule to the ITA. 
 
As already discussed earlier, bequest of a loan to the debtor (legatee) in terms of a will 
shall trigger the application of Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA.
253
 The 
proposed solution to this problem is to leave the outstanding debts due to him/her by the 
inter vivos trust to another trust (such as a testamentary trust) or to the surviving spouse or 
children.
254
 The requirements for a successful application of the new GAAR have already 
been discussed earlier and same will still apply.  
  
In order to determine whether this transaction has for its sole or main purpose to obtain a 
tax benefit, the factual circumstances will be weighed against the ipse dixit of the executors 
of the estate to discharge their onus in terms of S 80G of the ITA. There is a possibility that 
the testatrix did not enter such a transaction solely to obtain a tax benefit. Since the loan 
represents monies worth, in terms of capital and/or interest repayment on that loan, the 
testatrix intentions may have been for the legatee to benefit from that loan after her death. 
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The factual circumstances will have to support such intention; the trust must therefore be 
generating enough income for the loan repayment to the legatee. 
 
The purpose requirement is vital, if this bequest is a mere attempt by the taxpayer to extend 
his/her life for tax purposes in order to fall under the exempting provisions of S 56(2)(b) of 
the ITA and also to escape the ambit of Para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule, then the sole or 
main purpose to obtain a tax benefit requirement would be met.  
 
Assuming that the normality requirement will be met, on the strength of the judgment of 
Corbett JA in the Louw’s
255
 case as outlined earlier, the CSARS, may under the form 
versus substance doctrine argue that the whole transaction is a sham/ disguise to conceal 
the real nature of the transaction to the real world in order to fall within the ambit of that 
particular provision of the ITA to escape the liability of tax
256
 and consequently the whole 




It is to be noted here that exemption provision of Para 12(5)(a)(aa)(B) of the Eighth 
Schedule to the ITA cannot be applied in this situation as it will contravene the provisions 
of Para 40(2) of the same Schedule. 
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4.3 The use of testamentary trust to avoid/minimise estate duty 
The amendement
258
 to Section 4A of the EDA, provides that when a person was the spouse 
at the time of death of one or more previously deceased persons, the dutiable amount of the 
estate of that person must be determined by the deduction from the net value of his or her 
estate of an amount equal to R3,5 million: 
 Multiplied by two; and 
 Reduced by the amount deducted under section 4A from the net value of the estate 





Mr and Mrs. B were married in community of property, at the time of death of Mr. B; their 
joint estate had a market value of R 8 million. Mrs B had bequeathed all her assets to her 
husband. After 10 years, Mr. B also passed away.  
 
In terms of the EDA, the estate duty position of Mrs B at the date of death is as follows: 
 
Property in terms of S3 (2)  4,000,000 
Less deductions - S 4 q  4,000,000 
Net Value of Estate   - 
Dutiable amount of the Estate  - 
 
In terms of the EDA, the estate duty position at the date of death of Mr. B is as follows: 
 
                                                          
258
 Section 4A of the EDA was amended for persons dying on or after 01 January 2010. 
259
 Davis et al, Estate Planning, LexisNexis, 2010: 9-4(2); D Escott-Watson “the portability of the estate duty 

















Property in terms of S3 (2)  
   
12,000,000  
Less abatement - S4A (1)  
          
7,000,000  
Dutiable amount of the Estate  
     
5,000,000  
Estate Duty   
     
1,000,000  
 
Prior this amendment to S 4A of the EDA, some taxpayers were using a testamentary trust 
as a vehicle where it was possible to artificially carry-over the abatement of S 4A(1) of the 





 property to a trust and the remainder to the surviving spouse.  
 
The estate duty of the dying spouse would be minimised to nil because of the S 4(q) 
deduction and the abatement of R3.5m on properties kept in his/her estate and bequeathed 
to the family trust. 
 
The effect on the surviving spouse is that only the value properties bequeathed to him/her 
by the deceased spouse, at his/her date of death, plus any additions thereof would be 
included in the gross value of property. He /she may also deduct from that amount any 
allowable deductions as provided by S 4 of the EDA and will also be entitled to an 
abatement of 3.5 million. 
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4.3.1  Application of S 103(1) [old GAAR] 
 
As already mentioned the avoidance of estate duty would amount to a ‘tax benefit’ within 
its meaning in S 103(7) of the ITA. Although, the main purpose of the transaction is to 
obtain a tax benefit (estate duty), there are no taxes covered within the ITA (income tax, 
CGT or donations tax) that has been avoided. Therefore in terms of the provisions of S 
103(1) and taking into consideration of the definition of ‘tax’ in S 1, the Commissioner 
would not be empowered to re-determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy on income 
and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into 
or carried out. 
4.3.2 Application of Part IIA of the ITA (New GAAR) 
 
It is submitted that provisions of GAAR in the ITA cannot apply to any “other acts” 
(including the EDA) administered by CSARS, because these Acts are separate pieces of 
legislation. This is made clear by virtue of the remedy provisions contained in S 80B of the 
ITA, which states that “the Commissioner may determine the tax consequences under this 




Therefore if an arrangement is entered into that has solely for objective and purpose to 
avoid estate duty, VAT, transfer duty amongst others, the tax benefit obtained could not be 
prevented under S 80A as the CSARS would not have a remedy in S 80B to recover the tax 
so avoided.  
 
In spite of the above, applying Part IIA of the ITA to an arrangement involving trusts, in an 
event where transactions, which falls in a business context, involves elements of lack of 
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commercial substance as defined in S 80C of the ITA, CSARS may still have recourse to  
S 80F concerning connected persons
263
 to remedy the avoidance of taxes.  
 
It is worth noting that there are no general anti-avoidance provisions in the EDA as there 
are in the ITA and VAT Acts. General anti-avoidance provisions in the EDA were 
proposed in the 2008 Draft Revenue Laws Amendment Bill but were ultimately rejected.
264
  
It is therefore possible that the CSARS has acknowledged that there are shortcomings in 
Part IIA to prevent and remedy the avoidance of estate duty. 
4.4 The use of a discretionary inter-vivos trust to divest income from the 
 founder/donor 
Trusts are taxed according the provisions of S 25B of the ITA; however S 25B is made 
subject to S 7 of the ITA, which effectively means that in the tax computation of the trust, 
the provisions of this section shall be applied first and effectively overrides the provision 
of S 25B(1).  This will then determine whether the income will be taxable in the donor’s, 
the beneficiaries’ or the trust’s hands. This is also known as the attribution rules of trust 
income and this section (S 7) acts as a specific anti- avoidance provision. 
 
Most sub-sections of S 7 of the ITA require the element of ‘donation, settlement or other 
disposition’ be present and in that event, the income so attributed shall be deemed those of 
the donor to the trust. However, S 7(1) does not require that element to be present, thus 
income so attributed to a resident beneficiary who is a child of the donor and has attained 
the age of majority shall be tax in the beneficiaries hand. It is here assumed that there are 
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no conditions set by the trustees or the trust deed
265
 to the effect that the beneficiary shall 
not receive the income until the happening of an event, otherwise S 7(5) of the ITA shall 
prevail. The question whether the discretionary power of the trustees to distribute trust 






Mr. C, aged 55, had founded a discretionary inter-vivos family trust in 1992. The 
beneficiaries to the trust are the founder and his two children. The trust bought an 
investment flat in that year, which was partly financed by a loan from the founder and a 
loan from a financial institution. The rental income derived by the trust was used to repay 
the bond and financed other expenses, such as levies, insurance and maintenance cost. At 
the current date, the loan contracted from the financial institution has already been repaid. 
The loan from the founder has also been extinguished by using the annual exempting 
provisions of S 56(2) of the ITA.   
 
The two children of the founder are aged 20 and 21, being the other beneficiaries to the 
trust and are both universities students and do not earn any income. The trustees attribute 
the net monthly income of R 15,000 equally between the two children of the founder and 
this income finances their studies and their maintenance.  
4.4.1 The income tax implication 
Trust 
                                                          
265
 Estate Dempers v SIR, 39 SATC 95 


















Since the net income of the trust has been vested to the beneficiaries, S 7(1) of the ITA 
applies and therefore the R180,000 is not taxed in the trust.  It is submitted that the 
exercise of a discretionary power in respect of income distribution by trustees is an event 
as contemplated in S7(5) of the ITA. Therefore the income of a discretionary trust which 
arise from a donation, settlement or disposition will always be taxed in the ‘donors’ hand 
in terms of S 7(5) of the ITA unless it is distributed to the beneficiaries.
267
   
 
The Founder (year of assessment ending 28 Feb 2011) 
Mr. C, is employed and his yearly taxable income is R 300,000, therefore, for his tax 
payable is R 58,890. If the net income of the trust was vested to Mr. C in terms of S 7(5) of 
the ITA, he would have had a taxable income of R 480,000 and thus a tax liability of  
R 123,110. 
 
The other beneficiaries (year of assessment ending 28 Feb 2011) 
The other two beneficiaries being unemployed and having been vested a yearly income of 
R 90,000 each, their tax liabilities thereon is R 5,940 each. 
 
Conclusion 
As illustrated in this example, Mr. C has successfully divested income to his two major 
children using a trust as a vehicle and has also minimised considerably the tax liability by 
entering into a transaction with the other beneficiaries. Furthermore, if the rental income 
had accrued to him without the use of a trust, he would not have been able to deduct the 
expenses of maintenance of his two children by virtue of S 23(a) of the ITA. The issue 
whether the exercise of discretion to distribute income by the trustees in a discretionary 
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trust would constitute an event for the purpose of S 7(5) of the ITA is not clear and will 




4.4.2  Application of S 103 (1) [old GAAR] 
 
(a) Sole or main purpose to avoid tax 
On the interpretation of ‘sole or main purpose to avoid the liability of taxation’, Beyers 
JA
269
 concurred with the findings of the special court, where Watermeyer J said the 
following: 
“As a result of this series of transactions the income which the appellant would have received for his 
work and labour was transferred to his children, and the effect of the transactions was to avoid 
liability by the appellant for tax on that income. . . The word “scheme” is a wide term and I think 
that there can be little doubt that it is sufficiently wide to cover a series of transactions such as those 
mentioned above”. 
 
The preceding phrase of S 103 (1) which is  ‘transaction, operations or scheme’, is wide 
enough to encompass the vesting of the trust income to the beneficiaries to minimise tax 
liability as the trust is taxed at a higher rate than individual taxpayers.  However if the 
trustees is merely giving the effect of the objective of the trust deed such a transaction 
would not have as sole or main purpose to avoid tax.  
 
Furthermore, the vesting of trust income may also have a dual purpose, i.e. the 
minimisation of tax and also for the finance of the founder’s children’s education needs.  
Since the exercise of a discretionary power in respect of income distribution by trustees is 
an event as contemplated in S 7(5) of the ITA, the income of the trust which arise from a 
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donation, settlement or disposition will always be taxed in the ‘donors’ hand in terms of S 
7(5) of the ITA unless it is distributed to the beneficiaries.
270
 Thus the trustees is left with 
the option of taxation being levied on the entire trust net income in the founder’s hands or 
vest same to the other beneficiaries to minimise its tax liability as the trust may not be 
taxed in this particular instance. 
 
The trustees’ right in choosing the most tax effective manner to achieve the desired goals, 
has been outlined by Lord Tomlin in the Duke of Westminster case
271
 and was also 
accepted in Conhage.
272
   
 
(b) Abnormality and arm’s length transaction 
This kind of scheme has not been viewed on a positive light from the courts.  In the case of 
Meyerowitz v CIR
273
, in delivering his judgment, Beyers JA addressed the issue of 
abnormality in a similar scenario by referring to the judgement of Watermeyer CJ in CIR v 
King
274
 and Schreiner JA at 216 where the following statement was expressed: 
“Now normally and naturally the owner of an income-producing asset receives the income and the 
labourer receives the reward of his labour. Any departure from this order of things, if done with the 
object of prejudicing the fiscus, is the subject of legitimate objection by the Commissioner, which is 
met by the machinery of the section. In such cases, and in my view in such cases alone, it can be 
said that the Commissioner is seeking to tax the taxpayer on what is “in reality his income”, to use 
the expression employed by the Chief Justice. It is in reality his income because it should have 
accrued to him, and it can only be said that it should have accrued to him if it was the fruit of his 
capital or of his labour or both”. 
                                                          
270
 Huxham, K & Haupt, P “Notes on South African Income Tax – 2010”, p. 741 
271
 IRC v Duke of Westminster, 1936, 19 TC 490, p520 
272 CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd), 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA), 1999 Taxpayer 173, 1999 
(12) JTLR 337 
273
 Meyorowitz v CIR, 1963 (3) SA 863 (A), 25 SATC 287, p 299 
274

















Therefore a taxpayer who took advantage of S 7(1) of the ITA through the use of a trust, to 
divest himself of the fruits of his investments, to his children may be seen as abnormal. 
However, in the example in issue, the fruits of the investment do not belong to the 
founder/donor as the purchase of the property was financed partly by a financial 
institution; a transaction which was dealt at arm’s length. The gratuitous element present in 
this example is the interest free loan and subsequent donation of capital to the trust and 




Furthermore the vesting of the trust income vests on the discretion of the board of trustees. 
If the founder/donor does not have sufficient power to influence the board of trustees and 
the vesting of the trust income is in the objective of the trust, such a transaction may also 
not be viewed as abnormal or as sole or main purpose to avoid the liability of tax.  In the 
event that trustees are merely used as rubber st mps, the courts have sanctioned this 
practice. In the Badenhorst vs. Badenhorst
276
 case, where Combrinck AJA stated that: 
“de iure control of a trust is in the hands of the trustees, but very often the founder in business or 
family trusts appoints close relatives or friends who are either supine or do the bidding of their 
appointer.  De facto the founder controls the trust.  To determine whether a party has such control it 
is necessary to first have regard to the terms of the trust deed, and secondly to consider the evidence 
of how the affairs of the trust were conducted during the marriage”. 
 
Therefore the sound management of the trust plays a vital role as we have witnessed in the 
Badenhorst vs. Badenhorst
277





                                                          
275
 CIR v Louw, 1983 (3) SA551 (A), 45 SATC 113 
276
 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), Para 9 
277
 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) 
278

















(c) Substance v/s form doctrine 
The court may establish whether the substance of the transaction differs from its form, in 
other words the court needs to apply the “simulated transaction doctrine”. The application 
of this doctrine has been outlined in Para 3.3.  One of the indications for its successful 
application would be the trail of the trust funds that has been attributed.  In the event that 
trust fund which has been attributed to the beneficiaries (other than the founder/donor) has 
not actually been paid or expended for the purposes as stipulated in the trust deed, then 



















4.4.3  Application of Part IIA of the ITA (New GAAR) 
Is there a presence of an avoidance arrangement? 
The term ‘arrangement’ defined in S 80L of the ITA and the wordings ‘transaction, 
operation or scheme’ as contained in its definition, has been interpreted by the courts to be 
of such wide import that it is difficult to conceive how any question of tax benefit could 
arise without there being a transaction operation or scheme. In the Meyerowitz
279
 case, the 
court held that the term ‘scheme’ had a wide scope and could be applied if, viewed as a 
whole, the steps taken are so connected one with the other that they led to an avoidance or 
reduction of tax. 
On the other hand, the term ‘avoidance arrangement’
280
 means any arrangement that results 
in a tax benefit. The tax benefit obtained in the attribution of trust income to circumvent S 
7(5) of the ITA has been demonstrated above and is thus present. 
  
(a) Sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit 
In applying the purpose test under the old GAAR, the courts have preferred to apply the 
subjective test as opposed to an objective test.
281
  However in the new GAAR by virtue of 
S 80G of the ITA, it could result that the courts will deviate and  apply an objective test 
whereby the focal point is on the ‘effect ‘rather than relying on the intention of the 
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Although in this scenario, the entire scheme of the creation of a trust was for a legitimate 
family purpose, S 80G may empower the CSARS to apply GAAR to only part or step 
therein and in this case the attribution of trust income to beneficiaries other than the 
founder. However, in the Canada Trustco case, in deciding on the purpose test in S 245(3) 
of the Canadian Income Tax Act, McLachlin C.J applied a restrictive approach and 
expressed the following: 
“The expression “non-tax purpose” has a broader scope than the expression “business 
purpose”.  For example, transactions that may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken 
or arranged primarily for family or investment purposes would be immune from the GAAR under s. 
245(3).  Section 245(3) does not purport to protect only transactions that have a real business 
purpose”.
283
   
The choice principle has also been endorsed by the Australian courts in their interpretation 
of GAAR, in the case of Cridland v FCT.
284
 The taxpayer, a university student, invested in 
a unit trust, the court accepting that his sole purpose was to obtain the benefit of averaging 
his income according to the averaging provisions. Even though he deliberately created a 
favourable tax consequence, he was not caught by the anti-avoidance provision as the Act 
statutorily provided for this. Indeed, the validity of the transaction was not affected merely 
because the attendant tax consequences were advantageous to the taxpayer, even though he 




In the interpretation of S 80G, Olivier is of view of that it is presumed that an avoidance 
arrangement was carried into for the sole or main purpose to obtain a tax benefit and this 
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shifts the onus on to the taxpayer to prove otherwise.
286
 It is further submitted that if the 
taxpayer discharge that onus and the purpose is not tax avoidance S 80A of the ITA cannot 
be applied. 
 
Therefore an argument from the taxpayer that the attribution of trust income by the trustees 
to his children was effected for the sole or main purpose to finance their studies and prove 
that such monies was actually expended for that purpose, S 80A may not apply as the 
taxpayer is under no obligation to pay more tax than is required, he may choose a method 
to achieve his objective which is tax effective and that does not convert the transaction into 
one for obtaining a tax benefit.
287
 
 (b) The abnormality requirement and arm’s length transaction test 
The abnormality requirement in the new GAAR is governed by S 80A(a)(i) and (b) of the 
ITA and the arm’s length transaction test is governed by S 80A(c)(i). The arguments 
thereof have already been discussed above under the old GAAR and will still stand. 
(c)  The lack of commercial substance test 
The commercial substance test is a pre-requirement in a business context for the 
application of S 80A (S 80A(ii)), and this is defined in S 80C of the ITA. For the purpose 
of this example, S 80C(2)(a) is mostly applicable and the test of its successful application 
has been discussed above and will also still stand in this instance. The purpose of these 
provisions according to the National Treasury was to remedy the weaknesses of the 
abnormality requirement,
288
 but in any event these provisions were still in existence under 
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the judicial doctrines of legal form versus substance. Failure to pass the commercial 
substance test as defined in S 80C, the CSARS will be entitled to enforce  
S 80F of the ITA and treat all parties to this transaction as one and same person and 
therefore discard the attribution rules of S 7 of the ITA. 
 
(d) The misuse and abuse of the Act 
The misuse and abuse of the Act is governed by S 80A(c)(ii) of the ITA. The purpose of 
this provision is also to remedy the weaknesses of abnormality requirement.
289
 It is 
submitted that this provision is an alternative to the abnormality requirement, therefore if a 
transaction has for sole or main purpose of obtaining and tax benefit and there is also a 
misuse and abuse of the act, then S 80A of the ITA is applicable.
290
 The guidelines for 
interpreting this provision are found in the Canada Trusto 
291
 case.  
The taxation of trust income is governed by S 25B of the ITA and this section is subject to 
provisions as contained in S 7 of the ITA. The purpose of these provisions is aim 
effectively at preventing parties to a trust to split or divest their income thereby reducing 
their tax liabilities, which are the real spirit, objective and purpose of these provisions. 
Notwithstanding that trust income is already subject to specific anti-avoidance rules 
CSARS may also apply GAAR by virtue of S 80I of the ITA. However, if the board of 
trustees as already mentioned earlier are merely executing the purpose of the trust and the 
tax benefit obtained is merely incidental, the ITA could not have been frustrated, the act 
can only be frustrated if the series of transaction is pre-ordained. In that event, this 
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transaction may change its characteristics and may then become tainted as it can meet the 
‘sole or main purpose’ requirement. 
4.5  End of chapter conclusion 
 
It is evident that the new GAAR may have far reaching consequence on any arrangements 
that has for effect and results in a tax benefit. In a context of trusts, it has become more 
important that the purpose of the trust is clearly defined and should be other than tax 
benefits. The new GAAR also brings a certain amount of uncertainty in the tax system and 
without the guidance from our courts to interpret it in a South African context the depth of 




















Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Concluding remarks 
 
Prior formation of a trust, its progenitor must always perform a feasibly study to weigh the 
benefits of such vehicle and the corresponding costs and responsibilities towards its 
formation and also have to ascertain whether a trust will meet the required aims and 
objectives as laid down by the founder. 
 
In determining whether GAAR would apply to particular transactions in the trust, the 
courts may follow the steps as already laid down in cases involving trusts in non tax related 
environments, as has outlined hereunder, where the focus was on the administration of the 
trust and the control
292
 of the founders/donors over trust. The behaviour of the trustees and 
the administration of the trust will then give a clear indication as whether the trust is a 
sham trust and thus all the related transactions entered by the trust are preordained and 
preconceived to obtain tax benefits and the courts then may order that the trust be 
pierced/or disregarded. 
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5.2  Recommendations 
 
Hereunder are some recommendations which trustees may follow to help the trust 
discharge its onus in terms of S 82 and S 80G of the ITA once the CSARS has invoked 
Part IIA of the ITA on transactions involving a trust. 
(i) The trustee owes fiduciary duty to the trust and his private affairs should be 




(ii) The trust need to appoint independent trustees;
294
 
(iii) The trust need to appoint accounting officers to prepare financial statements and 
 help the public officer of the trust to submit the tax returns to SARS; 
(iv)  The trust need to formally keep minutes of the meetings of proceedings of the 
 board of trustees to evidence that all decisions taken on behalf of the trust were 
 made collectively; 
(v) In the event that any trustees may have an interest, the trustee should be excluded 
 from the quorum to avoid conflict of interest. However the remaining trustees 
 should ensure that they have the power and quorum in terms of the trust deed to 
 pass a resolution affecting the trust; 
(vi) Every transaction affecting the trust should have a clear purpose (even if the main 
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